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ABSTRACT 
Japan’s development of a m issile defense system has been accom panied by the 
acquisition of  potentia lly of fensive m ilitary assets, an inc reased com mand and control 
capability, significant restructuring of the coll ective defense establishment, and doctrinal 
changes that allow pre-emption should an atta ck be deemed imminent.  Regardless of the 
long-standing Japanese debate on the cons titutionality of the use of force, the 
introduction of m issile defense has institutiona lized key structural elem ents within the 
defense establishm ent m arking a clear m ilestone in an on going trend  towards security  
normalization.   
Under the broad rubric of m issile defe nse, Japan has had to re-evaluate its 
position on  the m ilitary use of space, the export of weapons techno logy, collectiv e 
security, command aut hority, and the condi tions under which pre-emption m ay be 
warranted.  These changes have m anifested them selves in m any ways, to include 
statutory changes, restruct uring an d elevation  of the form er Defense Agency, an 
increased emphasis on joint serv ice interoperability, and the acquisiti on of a broad range 
of advanced technologies.  It  is undeniable that the trend towards security normalization 
began with the inception of the National Police Reserve in 1950, but it can also be 
asserted that m issile defense has provided an  umbrella under which the trend has been 
significantly advanced. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Japan’s development of a m issile defense system has been accom panied by the 
acquisition of  potentia lly of fensive m ilitary assets, an inc reased com mand and control 
capability, significant restructuring of the coll ective defense establishment, and doctrinal 
changes that allow pre-emption should an atta ck be deemed imminent.  Regardless of the 
long-standing Japanese debate on the cons titutionality of the use of force, the 
introduction of m issile defense has institutiona lized key structural elem ents within the 
defense establishm ent m arking a clear m ilestone in an on going trend  towards security  
normalization.  This thesis will a rgue that the a ttendant policy changes and acquisitions 
associated with m issile defense co nstitute a significant an d enduring step toward s the 
normalization of Japan’s Self Defense Forces (JSDF). 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The security environment in East Asia is in the midst of considerable change, and 
it is irrational to assume that the defense arrangements of past decades will remain viable 
indefinitely.  China is taking its new found na tional wealth and is undertaking significant 
military modernization efforts, North Korea has steadily co ntinued its p ursuit of nuclear 
weapons, and the U.S. has become heavily committed in other parts of the world.  
Considered from  a Japanese perspective, these factors would co llectively suggest a 
relative reduction in the type of security that it experien ced throughout the Cold War.  
The presumed solution  to such a dilemm a lies in redu cing extern al reliance and 
developing the means to protect one’s self.   
In the case of Japan, this tends to be more com plicated as Article 9 of the 
Japanese C onstitution asserts that “the Ja panese people forever ren ounce war as a  
sovereign right of the nation and the threat  or use of force as m eans of settling  
international disputes.  In order to accom plish the aim  of the preceding paragraph, land, 
sea, and air f orces, as well as oth er war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
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belligerency of the state will not  be recognized.” This places the existence of any typ e of 
Japanese military force at the heart of an ongoing debate.  Externally, Japanese m ilitary 
advancements prom pt historical anim osity fr om regional neighbors who still h arbor 
resentment from World War II.  Japanese military advancements invariably foment some 
degree of regional resistance with  or without resolution of in ternal constitutional issues. 
Internally, however, there are other implications. 
If progress towards security norm alization can be demonstrated  then the 
constitutional debate becom es a less significant  factor in s ecurity discussions than the 
military reality.  As se curity normalization is approached, the true n ature of the inte rnal 
constitutional debate shifts from  whether or not to pursue it a nd towards acknowledging 
its inevitable achievement.  This implies that a demonstrated, advancing trend might also 
influence the constitutional debate in support of  security norm alization.  In this context, 
an exam ination of  secur ity trends w ithin J apan speaks to and potentially influences an 
issue long at the center of Japanese politics.       
While the d iscussion th us f ar has b een lim ited to East Asia, the im portance of  
regional stability clearly extends well beyond the region itself.  More specifically, the 
U.S. has direct economic interests that flow from a peaceful a nd secure East Asia.  If this 
security can be achieved through im proved Japanese capabilities and a greater 
willingness to engage in  regional crises, the U.S. gains a significant adv antage.  If Japan 
is fully able to prov ide for its own d efense, new regiona l security options are generated.  
The U.S. could potentially reduce or elim inate its forces in the region or, should the need 
arise, ally with a m ilitarily stronger Jap an to  prese rve r egional stab ility and  pr otect 
national interests.  In bo th cases an openly nor malized Japanese m ilitary lends itse lf to 
greater military economy for the U.S.   
   Beyond the practical m atter of national security, there is al so an underlying 
theoretical com ponent related to the secur ity dilemm a.  Specifically, how should one 
view m ilitary acquis ition in an env ironment in which the m argin between of fense a nd 
defense is increasingly narrow ?  T o am plify, t he detection, tracking, and disabling of 
inbound missiles is decidedly defensive.  However, by acquiring the requisite capabilities  
to achieve these functions, one may also  gain  the capacity  to  observe potential threats, 
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exercise a com plex command and control sy stem, and employ the apparatu s in an  
offensive manner despite the purported defensiv e role it was developed under.  This line 
of reasoning offers som e insight into external criticisms of Japanese m issile defense and 
highlights a key challenge in associating a capability with intent. 
Security arrangem ents are built under a certain set of conditions.  Conditions  
change, and East Asia is no exception.  The resulting ques tion for Japan is what type of 
security arrangement will best preserve national security, and the answer may be found in 
a m ore norm alized m ilitary c apability of  m eeting contem porary secu rity cha llenges.  
Moreover, the adoption of missile defense marks a significant step towards normalization 
without openly asserting it.  Ar ticle 82-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Measures for  
the Destruction of Ballistic Mis siles, the Prim e Minister is af forded the powers to m ake 
military decisions without consultation of the Diet.  Further, under certain conditions this 
authority may be passed to the Defense Mi nister.  W hile these pow ers are argu ably 
limited in that their ap plicability e xists with in the conf ine of  m issile def ense, the y are 
noteworthy in that they p lace the authority for military decision making in the hands of a 
single executive.  Of greater sign ificance is the scope of what such  a decision entails,  as 
the m issile defense in itiative enc ompasses e lements of each bran ch of the JSDF.  
Considered through this lens, m issile de fense has provided a galvanizing force  
consolidating the command authority of th e JS DF and im proving lateral coordination, 
both vestiges of a mature force. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The primary method for illus trating that normalization has been achieved  will be 
through comparative analysis of the JSDF agains t the militaries of other states.  This will 
be supported through open source docum ents on military re sources, spending, 
organizational structure, and doctrine available through the Japanese Ministry of Defense.  
Similar documents from other governm ents will be used as a m eans to com pare Japan’s 
defense forces against other m ilitaries.  The inte nt in doing so is to d emonstrate that, in 
terms of  capability, J apan has m et the stand ard of military normalization held by states 
without constitutional restrictions on the use of force. 
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In addition to the force com parison, this thesis will also be supported b y a post-
World W ar II historical analysis of addressi ng the evolution of the J SDF.  This is 
intended to  dem onstrate a steady increase in  J apanese m ilitary capability, us age, and 
prominence in government affairs and capture the impacts of key exogenous events.  This 
will be supported by historical documents that capture elements the key debates that have 
occurred regarding the roles and m issions of the JSDF.  By doing so, it can be  
demonstrated that there is an increasing tr end towards m ilitary no rmalization within  
Japan that culminates with missile defense. 
The final su pporting elem ent will be an an alysis of perception polls ad dressing 
current J apanese op inions on the u se of  m ilitary f orce, th e role of  th e JSDF, an d the  
overall threat environment.  By illustra ting that public opinion supports the use of 
military force under certain  conditions and pr oving the p resence of a credible m ilitary 
capability, the case for norm alization is s ignificantly strengthened.  Additionally, the 
potential impact of a direct security crisis on popular opinion will also be analyzed.  This 
will be accomplished through the use of existing opinion polls.      
D. ORGANIZATION 
This thes is will beg in by trac ing the orig ins of  Japan’s  cur rent security posture,  
beginning with how post-W orld War II Japan wa s re-forged as a pacifist nation and has 
steadily returned to a normalized state.  This will be accom panied by a brief examination 
of Japan’s current security c ontext and what it m ay perceive  to b e p otential thre ats.  
Together, these two elements establish the framework for why security normalization has 
been such  a conten tious issue with in Japan  an d why m odern circum stance seem s to 
demand a more pragmatic assessment of national security.  
The following section will exam ine the evo lution of Japan’s Self  Defense Force 
(JSDF) from its origins to its cu rrent state and offer a force com parison against what are 
viewed as n ormalized states.  Th is will de monstrate a su stained upward  trend in JS DF 
roles and ca pabilities since its in ception and that when contras ted against other states,  
Japan’s defense apparatus is quite nor mal despite any claim s to the  contrary.  The 
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purpose of this is to establish that a trend to  normalization exists and that missile defense 
ushers in a set of changes that significantly advances it.      
The evolution of  the JSDF will be f ollowed by an exam ination of  what m issile 
defense means in the broader context of a  trend towards normalization.  The capabilities, 
policy changes, and def ense restructuring that a ccompanied the deve lopment of  missile 
defense will each be considered in term s of  their broade r implications.  These changes  
formalize the new face of the Japan ese defense establishment to su ch a degree that it is  
unlikely to  rever t to  its p revious incarn ation, and colle ctively con stitute a  se t of  
advancements that significantly increase Japan’s military apparatus. 
Having considered the m ore em pirical as pects of Japanese defense, the next 
chapter exam ines internal and  external perceptions of J apanese s ecurity.  W hile the 
previous chapters have assessed capability, at this point the intent is  to develop a general 
assessment of perceptions and intent.  If Japa n is externally perceived to have already 
achieved security normalization, th en from an external perspec tive the issue is resolved.  
If internally Japan ha s yet to formally asse rt security norm alization, then internal polls 
and opinions of the broader popul ation and specific subsets m ay offer insight into future 
behavior.  This will be followed by the final chapter, which will summarize key elements 
of the argum ent and offer som e observations as to wha t the im plications of  sec urity 
normalization may be for Japan and the United States.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review has been developed to support three lines of argum ent which taken 
collectively illus trate J apan’s steady advanc e towards security no rmalization.  Whil e 
normalization is a somewhat elusive term , f or the purpo ses of  this thesis it will be 
considered as the capacity and willingness to employ military force in pursuit of national 
objectives.  This will be dem onstrated by comparing th e JSDF with an accep ted, 
normalized force.  The literature review develops this prem ise by considering the 
evolution of  the JSDF, dom estic and intern ational perceptions of the JSDF, and the 
impact that missile defense has had in advancing Japans security posture.        
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The first section consists of selected wo rks supporting the assertion that the JSDF 
has steadily increased in term s of  size, capab ility, and its r ole in natio nal secur ity.  By 
demonstrating the sustained expansion of the force, a clear trend becom es apparent.  The 
second section consists of works that capture  the scope of the changes associated with 
Japan’s m issile defense program .  These adva nces are co nsidered separately as they 
introduce both qualitative and structural advanc ements that represent a considerable leap 
in terms of Japan’s military resources.  
The next section focuses on works t hat speak to the possible internal and external 
perceptions of  Japan increa sing its m ilitary posture.  T his sec tion exam ines legal 
interpretations of Japan’s defense policy, popular and political elite opin ions on military 
matters, and external perceptions of Japanese militarization with the inte nt of identifying 
potential outcomes.  The intent in exploring these facets is to identify the degree to which 
they have impacted the expansion  of the JSDF and thus ascertain wh ich remaining issues 
may impede continued progress towards security normalization. 
To be sure, not all literature suggests th at the growth of Japan’s security force  
implies an increasing trend towards norm alization.  The fi nal section pr esents some  
opposing views that suggest that the orienta tion of the JSDF is not indicative of a 
movement towards normalization.  Moreover, the introduction of the changes attributable 
to missile defense is viewed by som e as being strictly defensive in  nature.  In ord er to  
craft a balanced argum ent and provide logica l counters, som e disse nting literature is 
explored.  
1. Status, Capabilities, and Trends of the JSDF 
From its origins in the early 1950s, the JSDF has experienced steady growth and 
prompted heated debate.  By identifying ke y milestones throughout its developm ent, it 
becomes possible to c learly illustra te a tre nd towards an increas ing military capability.  
Buck (1967) contributes to this by effec tively capturing the m indset, capabilities, and 
vision for the force as it was coming into maturity.  Buck’s article highlights the regional  
perspective during a point in Japanese history in which it w as regaining standing in the 
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international community and gaining  economic power.  These insights are useful to this  
thesis in that they establish a point of departure from which to assess the expanding roles 
and missions that the JSDF has assumed and shif ts in r egional conditions that may have 
prompted a need for a more robust military apparatus.   
While Buck offers insights into elem ents underpinning perceptions surrounding 
the JSDF in the 1960s, there is also a m ore mechanistic component of building a force.  
This manifests itself in more clearly observable features, such as the size of the force and 
numbers of weapons system s.  In t he case of  the JSDF, this presents som e irony as its 
growth has occasion ally com e through less direct m eans than m ight be exp ected.  
Samuels (2007) illu strates how Japan has grown a capable n avy under the auspices of a 
coast guard.   
The author dem onstrates how the deve lopment of a coast guard has provided 
Japan with a m eans to bypass legal, econom ic, and norm ative restrictions against force 
growth.  This article und erscores both the expansion of Japan’s aggregate military power 
and a circuitous route to achieve it.  In this  regard, there are som e parallels to m issile 
defense as it crosses into both technology sectors and spa ce exploration.  Given that 
Japan has previously exploi ted alternative routes of force generation, it is not  
unreasonable to consider missile defense as serving a similar purpose. 
While the preceding works speak to elem ents of history and a lternative means of 
force generation, a m ore comprehensive and dir ect approach is taken by author Jennifer 
Lind.  In developing her argum ents, Lind (2004)  employs several alternative m ethods to 
assess the relative strength of the JSDF.  She effectively establishes that Japanese military 
spending and the breadth of its capabilities ch aracterize it as one of the m ore advanced 
militaries in  the world.  Her article presents strong evidence illustratin g what th e JSDF 
has steadily m atured into.  Establishing th at Japan has steadily acquired one of the 
world’s leading military forces offers strong evidence to support a trend towards security 
normalization.  
Force com parisons offer a v ery m echanistic m eans of asses sing respec tive 
militaries, but what is o ften more telling is the organiza tion, doctrine and policies that 
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they em ploy.  The steady growth and expans ion of the JSDF ha s resulted in an 
organization that is  largely ind istinguishable from  a standing m ilitary.  W hile the 
distinction between an arm y and a defense force has often been a m atter of perception, 
author Nich olas Szechenyi advances the argum ent that Jap an’s in terests m ay lay well 
beyond its dom estic borders and that the current er a requires a m ore proactive defense 
policy.   
Szechenyi (2006) examines the in ternal discussions, political challeng es, and 
strategic rea lities th at h ave collectively sh aped what he believes to be a significant 
juncture for the future of Japanese defense policy.  His argument is relev ant to this thesis 
in that as a result of a changing global and regional security concerns Japan has crossed a 
significant political th reshold indicating support for a c ontinuing trend towards security 
normalization. 
Taken collectively, these works provide a basis for considering key elem ents of 
the JSDF’s evolution.  There is evidence of the early perceptions of what the force was 
intended to achieve and the issues surrounding it in the 1960’s, alternative means of force 
generation ostensibly intended to curtail cons titutional debate, force comparisons, and an 
assessment of  the reign ing secur ity clim ate.  Using this f ramework it is po ssible to 
illustrate the steady expansion of the JSDF in terms of capability and political acceptance. 
2. The Nature and Capabilities of Missile Defense 
While the preceding section addresses broad trends in the JSDF, the key argument 
of this the sis is  tha t the adoption  of  m issile def ense c onstitutes a  m ilestone that 
significantly advances the trend towards security normalization.  This is p remised on the 
aggregate capabilities that effectiv e m issile d efense enta ils.  More  precise ly, the 
acquisition of missile defense carries with  it the need for increased surveillan ce, 
command a nd control capabilities, acquisition of hardware that can track and destroy  
high speed projec tiles, a degree of  force projection for maritime based elem ents, and an  
organizational structure that enables swift decision m aking.  When m issile defense is 
decomposed, the constituent pieces  are sim ilar to what one would expect fro m a 
normalized state. 
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This thesis is clearly not the first exploration of Japan’s advance towards security 
normalization.  Oberle (2005) develops the pos ition that m issile defense is a key step 
towards norm alization.  The author reache s the conclusion that the trend towards 
normalization is clear, but has not yet been r eached.  Oberle’s line of reasoning is useful 
in the development of this thesis as it employs much of the same information to illustrate 
the steady growth of Japan’s arm ed forces.  However, since the com pletion of Oberle’s 
thesis ther e have been addition al s ecurity policy changes and restructuring of  Ja pan’s 
defense forces, both of which can be traced to missile defense.  In this regard, this  thesis 
expands on Oberle’s line of reasoning an d e xtends it to  incorpo rate new evid ence 
supporting his claim.   
Security normalization carries with it a presumption of the ability to project force, 
and m issile defense provides a som ewhat surre ptitious of developing this.  This is 
addressed by both Urayam a (2000) and Xueto ng (1999).  The latter author offers an 
assessment of the technological capabilities  that accompany m issile defense and 
concludes that “future achievements in research and development of missile defense will 
thus have the potential to im prove offensive missile technology.”  Relative to this thesis, 
his conclus ion supports  the assertio n that Ja pan’s forces have illus trated a steady trend  
towards more offensive hardware while also underscoring the narrowing margin between 
offensive and defensive military capabilities. 
In considering the offensive and defensiv e ch aracteristics of a m issile defense 
program, it is useful to identify m ilestones in its development.  This evolution is de tailed 
in the Monterey Institute of In ternational Studies 2003 publication, Ballistic Missile 
Defense in Northeast Asia: An Annotated Chronology 1990 – present.  Although slightly 
dated, this reference work offers a synops is of the significant events triggering 
contemporary interest in missile defense and the key capabilities emerging with it.  This 
study is useful to this thesis  in that it serves as a key reference for assessing the 
technological advancements in troduced to Japanese forces as part of the overarching 
rubric of missile defense. 
Missile d efense is far more com plex than  “po int and  sho ot.” I t invo lves the  
acquisition of myriad high tech  equipment, streamlined command and control, and rapid 
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decision m aking.  These capabilities represent a significant advancem ent for the JSDF 
and underscore the trend towards norm alization.  The works introduced in this section 
offer a means of identifying the components of missile defense that advance this trend. 
3. Perceptions of Security Normalization 
Perception is a key element in considering security normalization.  If an adversary 
perceives a  state as ha ving a capa ble m ilitary, then the r isk f or a security sp iral is 
heightened.  For this reason, external perceptions of Japanese militarization bear scrutiny.  
Note that this exists exclusive of any in ternal perceptions and should be considered 
separately.  The essence of the security spiral  is a potential adversary’s perception of the 
second party’s actions.    Thus, regardless of Japan’s intent its actions  will ultimately be 
judged by the beholder.  Insom uch as exte rnal perception m atters, the governm ent of 
Japan faces  an addition al burd en in ensuri ng that th e broader polity, which generally  
favors the “peace constitution,” is accepting of s ecurity actions.  If security m easures are 
viewed as too of fensive, political r isk is heightened.  Colle ctively, Japan has to balance 
internal and external perceptions su ch that it  presents both a credib le, deterrent military 
force and an otherwise benign dom estic defender.  Balancing these perceptions weighs 
heavily in Japans force development and employment. 
Perhaps one of the m ost objective w ays of assessing defens e policy is through a 
legal interpretation.  Som e aspects of this can be found in Arm strong’s (2006) 
examination of Japan’s Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and 
Security in a Situation of Armed Attack.  The law considers situa tions in which an armed 
attack again st Japan fro m the outside has occu rred and  in stances in which an arm ed 
attack is de emed imminent.  Expr essed dif ferently, th e law consider s actua l m ilitary 
attacks and the expectation of attacks.   
To this end, som e Japanese officials have  been quoted as asse rting that attacking 
North Korean m issile bases should legally  be considered as self-defense.  




encompass military pre-emption is a marked departure from the renunciation of force and 
stands as strong evidence that Japan ha s advanced the trend towards security 
normalization. 
Another ind icator of  internal p erceptions of  the  m ilitary is the degr ee to which  
military heritage is em braced.  Ryu (2007) sets  surveys the opinions of Japanese elites  
regarding state visits to the Yasukuni Shri ne.  The shrine, comme morating Japan’s war 
dead, exists  at the cen ter of a lo ngstanding regional controve rsy involving Japan’s 
imperial past.  Within the PRC and Korea, Japanese state visits to the shrine tend to spark 
remembrances of past transgressions.  In th is regard, the Yasukuni Controversy is linked 
to security normalization.  Expressed differently, state visits to the shrine prompt regional 
concerns ov er Japan em bracing its m artial her itage and re -militarizing.  In this reg ard, 
elements of the debate mirror regional concerns about Japanese security normalization. 
Ryu’s work is based on a 2006 survey he conducted of members of the House of 
Representatives in the National Diet of  Japa n.  Using his survey and press releases of 
official statem ents regarding the Y asukuni Shrine m ade by the Chinese, Korean, and 
Japanese governm ents, the au thor argues that the Yasukuni  controversy is a relevant 
gauge of regional and domestic acceptance of a normalized Japan.  This  work is relevant 
to this thesis in that his study offers an indirect view on prevailing sentim ent regarding 
Japanese security normalization. 
A m ore direct indicato r of national wil lingness to em ploy its  m ilitary can b e 
found in public respons es to th e us e of m ilitary force.  Is hibashi (20 07) exam ines the 
relationship between opinion re garding deployment of the JS DF and its  rela tionship to  
political action.  The author presents evid ence indicating that popular opinion has not 
played a sig nificant role in political decisions rega rding force deploym ents.  In essence, 
this would seem  to delink popular opinion fr om security norm alization discussions and 
suggest that the m ore telling ind icator is th e opinion of political elites, addressed m ore 
fully by Ryu. 
Ishibashi’s work is relevant to this thesis in that it offers insight to where the locus 
of military willingness resides and whether it is  relevant.  Thus, if security norm alization 
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is es chewed by the  m asses bu t em braced by  a  m inority o f political e lites, his a rticle 
would suggest that normalization is not predicated on public acceptance.  This fram es an 
argument in which pop ular opinion polls  can b e considered in a less  definitive fashion, 
and m ore focused polls of rele vant actors can be weighted appropriately.  If it can be  
illustrated that the de cision f or sec urity no rmalization is g enerally re sistant to pu blic 
opinion, then a key argument against it has been negated. 
An opposing view is provide d by Paul Midford, who su ggests that Japanese 
public opinion is highly relevant to secur ity policy.  Midford’s arguments build on 
several of his previous works.  Midford ( 2002) considers Japanese public opinion in 
contrast to that of its regional neighbors and Midford (2003) exam ines Japanese opinion 
in response to the deploym ent of the JSDF  to the Arabian Sea in  2001.  Midford (2004) 
notes a pattern found in the Maritim e Self De fense Force (MSDF) in which a plan for  
operations is put forth, cont roversy unfolds, the mission is accepted, the MSDF performs 
well, and the controversy fade s into obscurity.  This tren d suggests that the tangible 
impact of public opinion has been to slow the rate of policy change.  W hile this has 
allowed for an expansion of the JSDF in to an expanding array of defensive or supporting 
roles, a m uch harder line is found in rega rd to an offensive vice defensive m ilitary 
orientation, where staunch public opinion  has consisten tly sta lled sign ificant 
advancement. 
Midford also notes that the Japanese public has steadily adopted a defensive 
realist s tance that recog nizes th e utility of  m ilitary power in hom eland defense, but is 
particularly resistant to embracing offensive military power.  Midford traces thes e views 
to the Japa nese public ’s reac tion to the U.S. invasion of Afgha nistan and Iraq, 
respectively.  Whereas the former was understood, the latter was opposed.  Placed in the 
context of Ryu and Ishibashi, Midford’s ar ticle presents strong evidence that not only 
does opinion m atter in Japanese security policy, but that public opinion plays as 
important a role as elite opinion.  The dive rsity of m ethods and conclusions found by 
these three  authors p rovide f or sig nificant d iversity in evaluating the role of popular 
opinion in Japan. 
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Perception matters, but it is also highly subj ective.  The readings of this section  
offer perspectives from a legal in terpretation, from the vantage poin t of Japan’s political 
elite, and from Japan’s broader public.  These opinions constitute part of a broader array 
of considerations that, over tim e, may expe dite or hinder the norm alization trend.  The  
polls also of fer some insight into wh y missile defense presents such an a ttractive option 
to more hawkish polic y advocates, as it reta ins the def ensive character that th e public is 
willing to a ccept while  also allows  for an increase in offensive capac ity.  W hile it is 
beneficial to consider the empirical aspects of the evolution of the JSDF, developments of 
this type are driven by p olitical will which is  often a m anifestation of public acceptance.  
The trend towards nor malization will ultim ately advance  at the degr ee to which such 
forces will allow.  
4. Dissenting Views 
 As might be expected, however, not all are of the evidence fir mly supports the 
claim that Japan’s path constitutes a trend to wards normalization.  Further, there are also 
contrasting views on the im plications of  m issile def ense in regards to the direc tion of 
Japanese security.   Hu ghes (2004 ) acknowled ges th at Jap an is  increasing its  m ilitary 
capabilities, but offers a competing explanation in terms of its rationale.  Hughes suggests 
that the nature of Japan’s acquisitions do not indicate a departure from a strictly defensive 
policy, nor do they imply a more autonomous security posture.   
The author  argues tha t the m otivations f or s uch capabilitie s are intended to  
reinforce its  role  in  UN security m issions and that Japan’s m issile defense initiative 
retains U.S. dependencies.  As an outcom e of this, Japan’s defense doctrine is becom ing 
increasingly intertwined with the U.S., to the point that it would be unable to defend itself 
absent U.S. assis tance, let alon e engage in acts of aggression.  Taken collectively, this 
would im ply that although the JSDF has incr eased its capabilities,  the balance of the 
force is suc h that it doe s not f acilitate independent action.  Give n these limitations, the 
alternative explanation would be less of a trend towards nor malization and more towards 
restructuring what remains a defensive security force.   
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While Hughes’s argument has merit, the counter is found in the ambiguous nature 
of m odern defense technology which carries  with it both offensive and defensive 
potential.  The techno logies through m issile defense enab le sweep ing changes  in the 
command and control a nd employment of forces, permitting an operational synerg y that 
belies its size.  The technological am biguity coupled with m ore perm issive changes  
towards Japanese security policy implies, a t the least,  a tre nd towards a Japanes e force 
capable of independent action. 
 Another argument against a norm alizing trend is found in the internal Japanese 
debate on Article 9.  As Artic le 9 resid es at the cen ter of  security discussions, its 
existence as  written would seem  to pose a barrier to norm alization.  Difilippo (2 002) 
considers Japanese public op inion regard ing secur ity m atters and  of fers evidence 
suggesting significant contradict ions in public sentim ent a nd security practice.  The  
opinion polls cited indicates considerable misgivings regarding alliance with the U.S. and 
consistently strong support for Article 9.  However, although the public view s the 
alliance with the U.S. as being a key source as being a key source of  East Asian friction, 
this has not precluded increasi ng s ecurity tie s m ost notably in the r ealm of  m issile 
defense.  Article 9 presents a far different case. 
Citing Japanese opinio n polls fro m 1997 and 2001, Difilippo presen ts evidence 
suggesting sustained and overwhelming support for retaining Article 9.  Moreover, while 
it may be politically feasible for Japanese policymakers to support the practical matters of 
defense strategy, constitutional issues carry m uch greater po litical consequence.  This 
does not directly refute a growing trend to wards normalization, what it does suggest is 
that if such trend exists it will be arrested at the point of constitutional change.  Expressed 
differently, if  it is  accepted that normalization is achieved at the poi nt of rescinding or  
altering Article 9, this article offers evidence that this will not easily be achieved.   
Difilippo’s argument implies that norm alization is centered on Article 9, which 
may not be accurate.  As noted by the auth or, Japanes e security policy has often 
advanced in a direction inconsistent with public opinion.  This would suggest that defense 
capabilities and policy can m ature independe ntly, and with les s politic al r isk, than 
constitutional change.  By delinking Article 9 from normalization, it is possible to more  
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empirically consider the growth of the JS DF a nd the im plications of policy changes 
associated with missile defense.  Ultimately, Article 9 may become irrelevant in the  face 
of aggregate capability and external perceptions of Japan’s military capability.       
Other analysis indicates that Japan is following a highly contra dictory path with 
an uncertain outcome.  Mulgan (2000) observe s that by engaging in missile defense with 
the U.S., Japan has seem ingly stepped away from  an autonom ous path and positioned 
itself as a ‘strategic sa tellite’ of  the U.S.  In contras t, Japanese defense policy has a lso 
become oriented towards the assumption of a regional security role, extending beyond the 
confines of its own borders.  To som e degree, Sa muels (2006) makes a similar 
observation by noting that Japan tends to hedge on security matters in search of a security 
strategy that balances its regional and global interests. 
Whereas Samuels considers broader securi ty strategy, the contradiction Mulgan 
refers to is found the simultaneous pursuit of increased security dependency while also 
increasing the capacity for au tonomous operation.  She c oncludes that while these 
changes are underway, Japan is positioned to pur sue either path and no clearly definitive 
trend can be ascertained.  W hile elem ents of this argum ent rem ain valid, the body of 
evidence that has beco me available since 200 0 lends itself to a cleare r interpretation of 
long term strategy. 
5. Summary of Literature 
 Taken colle ctively, the re is a suf ficient body of work to advance the key 
arguments of this thesis.  Several authors have developed the argument that the JSDF has 
evolved significantly since its inception.  There are also num erous works on m issile 
defense, exploring it from political, ec onomic, m ilitary, and technological angles .  
Together, these works suggest that m issile defense is a far m ore nuanced issue than 
shooting do wn inbound m issiles, o pening the possibility that one of the nuances  is 
security no rmalization.  In add ition to th e more em pirical discuss ions on m ilitary 
hardware, the dim ension of in ternational and Japanese perc eptions regarding its m artial 
heritage and  the futu re of the JSDF are also  e xamined in severa l wor ks.  Alterna tive 
views have also been considered, and argum ents have been introduced to counter their 
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efficacy.  While there is merit in each of the dissenting works, collectively the litera ture 
reviewed lends itself to the argum ent that Japanese security normalization has con tinued 
and is becoming increasingly entrenched.  
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF JAPAN’S SELF DEFENSE FORCES 
A. THE ORIGINS OF “ABNORMALIZATION” 
Japan has constitutionally eschewed the use of force to resolve issues since World 
War II.  Further, it has largely placed its security interests in the hands of the U.S.  While 
this has been advantageous for the past six decades, it cannot be taken for granted that 
U.S. security intere sts will rem ain constant in the face of i ncreased economic interest in 
China and increas ing m ilitary comm itments in other parts of the world.  This presents 
Japan with a som ewhat unique d ilemma in that it is faced  with a future that in  which it 
may very well have to assum e greater re sponsibility f or its own secur ity while  
constrained internally by constitutionality and e xternally by  regional perceptions of  re-
militarization.  The foremost m eans of achiev ing this  security is  found in Japan ’s Self  
Defense Forces (JSDF).  The inten t of this ch apter is to characterize the stra tegic factors 
that have shaped Japan’s perception of what  the JSDF should be and trace its evolution 
from a National Police Reserve to a world class military. 
B. JAPAN’S STRATEGIC ROLE 
Prior to making a de termination of  the n ecessary se curity appa ratus an  
examination of Japan' s perceived strategic role  needs to be considered.   A state th at is  
pursuing a strictly  def ensive pos ition will cultivate m ilitary, politica l, and econo mic 
strategy em phasizing defensive principles.  Si milarly, a s tate that is intent on  reg ional 
hegemony or aggressive expansion will shap e its forces and policies accordingly.  In  this 
regard, even in the absence of an overtly stated strategic role, indicators of intent become 
apparent.  However, th ere remains the r isk that these indicators m ay be m isinterpreted.  
This presents a unique set of challenges for Japan as there is a general regional bias 
against Japanese militarization stemming from events pr eceding and during W orld War 
II.   
As alluded  to, the re re mains significant historical anim osity regarding Japan’s 
aggressive expansion in the first half of the twentieth century.  Thus, any actions taken to 
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indicate a Japanese desire to expand be yond its borders prom pt significant regional 
concern.  Further, for the latter half of the twentieth century much of Japan's strategic role 
was imposed upon it by the U.S.  This has led som e scholars to surm ise that Japan ma y 
not as be well-pos itioned to def ine a stra tegic role whe n com pared to other modern  
nations.  T his lack of  experience has th e potential to inadve rtently send the wrong 
strategic signal to other regional actors. 
This leaves the question  of  Japan' s stra tegic role unanswered.  W ith the rise of 
China and a nuclear No rth Korea, the statu s quo does not seem  to present itself as a  
tenable op tion.  Further, within the past d ecade Japan has dispatched destroyers to the 
Indian Ocean, fired on a North Korean spy boat, and hosted the Afghan reconstruction 
conference.1  This would  seem to indicate a s tate that is increasingly capable and willing 
of assuming responsibility for its own security, acting as a full participant in international 
crisis, and behaving in an otherwise "normalized" fashion.   
While this does not answer the question of  Japan's strategic role, it do es illustrate 
that Japan is now stepping beyond its borders and is willing to em ploy both force and 
threat of force despite constitutional limitations that would seem to prohibit such actions.  
Collectively, this  fram es at leas t o ne elem ent of Japan' s security challenge.  By not 
participating in crisis response, Japan is assigned the unfavorable moniker of "free rider." 
By participating in crisis response, Japan risks being construed as aggressive.  This 
frames the competing external pressure in defining Japan's strategic role; it is too engaged 
for some and not enough for others. 
Ultimately, in cons idering Japan' s s trategic intent the re is no def initive answer.  
This discussion can be reduced to two direct ly opposing views.  A m ore skeptical view 
holds that J apan is stea dily acquiring the military capabilities and strategic reach  to 
complement its econo mic strength and set condition s to achieve regiona l power 
aspirations.  This is su pported by noting Japan’s expanding peace k eeping activ ities, 
ongoing pressure to revise the constitution, a nd extensive military cooperation with the 
U.S. in missile defense and the procurement of offensive hardware.  The alternative view 
                                                 
1 Mindy Kotler and Daisuke Okuyama. “Japan's Global Ambivalence.” Foreign Policy, no. 130, 
(2002): 96-97. 
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holds that Japan's use and development of its military forces is wholly defensive in nature 
and simply another step towards a more "normalized" Japan that is capable and willing to 
bear a m ore equitable share of the global responsibilities associated with being a 
powerful state.2 In either case, a c learly emerging trend towards a more capable military 
has emerged. 
C. JAPAN’S REGIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT 
Just as a state' s vision o f its future de fines how it em ploys its resources, so too 
does the current security environment.  In the case of Japan, t here are several factors that 
have a significant im pact on its imm ediate secu rity.  The com bined factors  of a rising  
China, a "miscreant regime in North Korea,"3 the possibility of eventual abandonment by 
the U.S., and the relative decline of the Ja panese econom y have had a significant and 
adverse impact on the security outlook. 4 Further, Japan' s high degree of dependence on 
external sources for energy is a recurring challen ge.  As a co nsequence of the emergence 
of China and the m odernization of both Sout h Korea and Taiwan, there exists a strong 
regional competition for these resources.   
 While one scenario could envision these changes as being completely benign, it is 
manifesting itself as a case st udy of  the security dilemm a.   North Korea is gripped by 
existential fear as an outcom e of being branded a pariah by the world' s rem aining 
superpower.  As an outcome, it moves towards nuclear armament as a means to secure its 
survival.   W ith its ex pansive bo rders and  steadf ast em phasis on  te rritorial in tegrity, 
China has p roceeded do wn a path  o f extensive  m ilitary m odernization and reform .  In  
response to these activities, Japan proceeds dow n a path of extensive m issile defense and 
increased force projection.  The outcom e of th is is that as each country takes action to 
increase its own security, it reduces the security of other regional actors.5 
                                                 
2 Alan Dupont, Unsheathing the Samurai Sword: Japan’s Changing Security Policy.  The Lowy 
Institute for International Policy.  Lowy Institute Paper 03. New South Wales, Australia: Longueville 
Media. (2004): 10 - 15.   
3 Richard Samuels. “Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy,” The Center for Strategic and International Studies 
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2006): 111–127. 
4Ministry of Defense, Japan.  Korean Peninsula. <www.mod.go.jp>. Accessed 21 April 2008.  
5 Richard Samuels, “Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy,” The Center for Strategic and International Studies 
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2006): 111–127. 
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 Perhaps even more worrisome is the  degree to which the increased militarization 
is accompanied by increased nationalism throughout the region.  In the case of China, this 
appears to be associated with generational change.  A point has been reached in which the 
political leadership did not directly expe rience W orld W ar II (the Pac ific W ar) or the 
postwar party struggles.  Having enjoyed both peace and prosperity, China seems to have 
achieved a degree of  ideological vindicatio n resulting in conditions that allow 
nationalism to thrive.  In the case of Japan, the collapse of the Japa n Socialist party has 
facilitated a shift to the right and the increasing power of China has galvanized the reality 
that regional econom ic primacy may very well be fleeting.  The anxiety stemm ing from 
these factors are generally supported more nationalistic policies.6 
 The combined factors of a more challenging security environment and a degree of 
generational change have resulted in a Japan that is incre asingly more likely to em brace 
the use of force to protect its interests.7  This is not meant to imply that Japan has adopted 
a more hegemonic view of the region, but rather to suggest that the m ost probable future 
for Japanese security entails the use of defense forces in a far m ore visible regional and 
global role.  These activ ities would potentially e ntail missile defense, maritime security, 
humanitarian relief , and other opera tions consistent with the  use of m ilitary f orce a s a 
responsible member of the international community.8  
Perhaps the most telling  indicator of Japan's shifting attitude  towards its security 
environment is the statem ents publicly avai lable through the Ministry of Defe nse.  
Whereas Article 9 of the Japanese constitu tion renounces war and the threat or use of 
force as m eans of settling disputes, the Minist ry openly asserts that “In situations where 
an arm ed attack is an ticipated, any and all m easures m ust be taken so  as to avoid  the 
occurrence of such an attack.” 9 Not only does th is statement imply a willing acc eptance 
                                                 
6 Francis Fukuyama, “The New Nationalism and the Strategic Architecture of Northeast Asia,” Asia 
Policy 3 (January 2007): 38-41. 
7 Alan Dupont, Unsheathing the Samurai Sword: Japan’s Changing Security Policy.  The Lowy 
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8 Nicholas Szechenyi, “A Turning Point for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces,” The Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2006): 139-150. 
9 Ministry of Defense, Japan.  Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan, Disaster Relief 
and Civil Protection.  < www.mod.go.jp >.  Accessed 21 April 2008.  
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of the use of force in settling disputes, it also carries with it a h int of preem ption.  
Further, the very existence of a defense fo rce is in its ow n right a de terrent m easure 
through the presence of m ilitary force.  In response to an increas ingly complex security 
environment, Japan h as stead ily cr afted a de terrent m ilitary f orce and  a pr e-emption 
strategy within the con straints of  c onstitutional pacif ism.  Two of  the questions that 
emerge from this are  how was Jap an able to generate a force within s uch constitutional 
constraints and what capabilities h as it been able to dev elop?  The answer to these 
questions is found in an examination of the origins and steady expansion of the JSDF.  
D. JAPAN’S SELF DEFENSE FORCES 
1. From Humble Origins 
The JSDF of  today bear s little re semblance the  National Police Res erve it wa s 
initially conceived as in 1950.  Moreover, its very formation was a st ark contrast to the 
tenets of th e 1947 peace constitu tion.  The i mpetus for this  force was not borne of a  
Japanese desire to rem ilitarize, but rather th e U.S. involvem ent in Kor ea.  In 1950, as  
conflict emerged on the Korean Peninsula,  G eneral Douglas MacArthur was both the 
supreme commander of the allied p owers in Japan and the commander of United Nations 
(UN) forces in Korea.  The swift collapse of South Korean forces prompted an immediate 
need for U.S. assistance.  To th at end, occupation forces stationed in Japan were quickly 
committed to Korea.  T his pre sented a new ch allenge in that Japan  was now lef t with  
minimal protection and thus highly vulnerable  to Soviet invasion.  MacArthur’s solution 
was found in an expanded police force.10 
On July 8, 1950, MacArthur “authorized” the establishment of the National Police 
Reserve.  Notably, the authorization is m ore aptly characterized as  an order, as the 
Japanese government did not request the form ation of such a force.  Moreover, the U .S. 
and Japanese interpretation of what such a force would consist of differed significantly.  
While the Japanese initially v iewed this a s a requirement to increase th e size of ex isting 
                                                 
10 Tetsuo Maeda. The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces. Chicago: Edition q, 
1995. 
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police forces, the occup ying U.S. forces were  oriented towards Japanese rearm ament.  
The dispa rity was quic kly re solved with the publica tion of  the “Framework of th e 
National Police Reserve,” which, am ong othe r requirem ents, established a national 
command a nd divided the country  into four regional districts, each with a regional 
division.  N ot coincidentally, these regional d istrict divisions filled the v oid left by U.S. 
divisions which had deployed to Korea. 11  Despite being designated as a police force, its 
role was clear. 
This placed  the Japanese government in a politically precarious position.  The  
peace con stitution, which renounced  the u se of force, rem ained very  po pular with the 
Japanese citizenry which had long suffered th rough years of war.  The government found 
itself politically constrained from rewriting the constitution to allow for rearmament.   As 
a result of this, im plementation took pl ace under the provisions of the Potsdam 
Declaration, which required that government orders based on directives from the General 
Headquarters (GHQ) of the occupying force be  treated as law, regardless of public 
support or Diet approval. 12 This offers a glim pse into thre e trends tha t will be visible  
throughout the developm ent of the  now JSDF: a heavy U.S. influence, a capacity to 
develop the force despite constitutional constr aints, and an advancem ent of the security  
agenda absent strong public support. 
2. Growing the Force 
Under the clear direction of  GHQ,  coupled with MacArt hur’s personal i mpetus, 
the core of the Police Reserve began to fo rm in October of 1950.  Despite its widely 
recognized military nature, it was clearly not a re-iteration of the form er Imperial Army.  
The new inductees were volunteers vice conscr ipts, they w ere loyal to  the constitution  
vice th e emperor, and h eaded by a civilian commandant rather than a  f ormer m ilitary 
officer.  Initial recruitment was heavily in centivized through comparatively high pay and 
benefits with opportunity for advancem ent.  These incentives were quite clearly 
                                                 




successful, as nearly 400 ,000 applicants submitted for 75,000 positions.  Initially  trained 
under American drill instructors on Am erican bases, equipped with Am erican weapons, 
and led by Am erican officers the early force was i mbued with decidedly Am erican 
qualities and was generally indis cernible from  an Am erican unit. 13 For all inten ts a nd 
purposes, the Police Reserve could more aptly be  considered as a reserv e for U.S. forces 
deployed to Korea. 
The end state of  this in itiative was, of  course, an arm y, replete with artillery and 
tanks provided by the U.S.  Additionally, th e organizational structure mirrored the U.S. 
Army, with regimental equivalents, companies, and platoons.  Training entailed attacking 
fortified pos itions with artille ry and  incendia ry rockets, eup hemistically referred to  as 
‘special instruments’ and ‘special firing devices.’  Perhaps the most telling indicator of its 
military role was the re- assimilation of former Japanese m ilitary officers into the f orce.  
While they had originally been excluded, the practical realities of leading a large military 
force coupled with the urgency U.S. troops departing to the escalating Korean War 
prompted a new appreciation of  military experience.14  Ulti mately, the governm ent and 
the public were all aw are of the Police Rese rve’s true function, but it was a lie that 
everyone accepted.   
While the developm ent of the Poli ce Reserve prom pted s ome exa mination of  
constitutionality, the  d evelopment of  the m aritime arm  proved f ar le ss controver sial.  
Naval rearmam ent occurred in such a transp arent m anner largely becaus e the Im perial 
Navy was not fully dissolved following W orld War II.  The need to r epatriate so ldiers 
and colonis ts in f ormer terr itories as  well as  remove m ines in the Japanese archipelago 
created a need for a functioning  n avy.15  So, while clearly reduced from  its previous 
stature, the Japanese navy experien ced a sh ift in f unction r ather than  being completely 
dismantled.   
                                                 





Notably, the m ine clearing experience ga ined by the re-designated Japanese 
Maritime Safety Agency would be employed during the Korean W ar.  In October 1950, 
the U.S. was contem plating a land attack at  Wonsan and had signi ficant concerns about 
North Korean mines.  Absent sufficient m inesweeping capabilities, the U.S. Navy called 
upon Japan to offer assistance, w hich was pr ovided.  This is significant for several 
reasons.  The f irst is tha t Japanese n aval assets directly participated in the Korean W ar 
and greatly assisted the U.S. e ffort; the second is that one of  the Japanese ships struck a 
mine killing one sailor and injur ing eighteen o thers.  Perh aps m ost importantly,  the 
Japanese governm ent kept all news of the operation and casualties from the Japanese  
people.  These positive contri butions reflected well on th e service, and strengthened the 
case for its continued existence.  B y 1952, se veral restrictions on the Maritim e Safety 
Agency were rescinded and the Maritime Security Force was established.16 
1952 also m arked another m ilestone in the developm ent of the JSD F.  As an 
outcome of the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty, Japan was required to play an increasing 
role in its own defense.  As a result, a bill was introduced into Japan’s lower house 
proposing the integration of the Police Reserv e and the Maritim e Security Force.  Other  
proposed measures included increasing the capab ilities of land and sea forces to provide 
for the defense of Japan.  Article 9 was def tly avoided by the assertion that such a force 
fell short of war potential and was thus cons titutional.  The Security  Board bill was 
subsequently passed and in October of 1952 Japan’s de-facto army and navy became the  
Security Forces.  This represented far m ore than a name change, however, as force size,  
the number of ships, and weapons were all dram atically increased.17 This increa se soon 
prompted a U.S. re-evaluation of security arrangements. 
Given the increased Japanese capabilities and formalization of its Security Force, 
in 1953 the U.S. proposed that Japan increas e its size and participate in a m ilitary 
assistance system based on the Mutual Secur ity Assurance (MSA) act .  Under the MSA, 
Japan would receive financial as sistance, but would also be e xpected to contribute to the 
                                                 




collective d efense of other states.  Add itionally, countries accep ting MSA assistance 
would be required to increase defense spen ding.  The U.S. presented a proposal to 
increase Japan’s defenses, which Japan viewed  as wholly u nrealistic.  Citing Artic le 9 , 
pacifist values, econom ic restriction, and manpower lim itation, Japan resisted the U.S. 
push towards a m ore capable force.  The fi nal com promise consisted of a Ja panese 
ground force of approxim ately 180,000 troops, 17,000 m aritime personnel, and an air 
force of 600 fighting aircraft and 20,000 personnel. 18  The size of the force was 
ultimately b ased less o n f orce r atios and con stitutionality, but ref lected an  inter nal 
political assessment of an acceptable number. 
The Security Forces were thus re-fashi oned as the Self-Defense Force under the 
Defense Agency in 195 4 which was accom panied by the Basic National Defense Policy  
shortly ther eafter.  No tably, th e policy was  written  with a degr ee of  bureaucratic 
ambiguity that has permitted a high degree of flexibility and government reinterpretation.  
The policy allowed f or “developin g progress ively the ef fective d efensive capab ilities 
necessary for self-defense” and  a capacity “to deal with  external aggression on the basis 
of U.S. – Japan security arrangem ents pending more effective functioning of the UN.” 19  
The somewhat open interpretation of “necessa ry” has allowed for a practical upper lim it 
defined by what the prevailing political situation would allow. 
 Just four years after its original conception, the JSDF had b ecome an entrenched 
element of J apanese society, but a m ilitary consists of far more than force stru cture.  In 
addition to manpower, equipment is also required.  While originally outfitted by the U.S., 
the 1950’s ushered in the rebirth of the Ja panese defense industry.  In March of 1952, 
GHQ rescinded earlier prohibiti ons on the Japanese production of weapons and aircraft.  
This was swiftly followed by Japan’s passing of the Law for Production of W eapons in 
1953 and the Aircraft Production Enterprises Ac t in 1954.  These laws provided the basis 
for continued Japanese re-arm ament, and allowed for equipping a 180,000 m an ar my, 
120,000 tons of ships, and an air force of 1,300 planes.  From the late 1950s to the early 
                                                 




1970s Japan’s Defense Buildup Program s played a significant role in stim ulating 
production to the extent that by the late 1960s over 90% of Japan’s defense orders were  
domestic.20 
 The importance of establishing a defense industry cannot be understated.  While it 
does not speak directly to co mbat power, it does address a much broader set of factors 
pertaining to defense norm alization.  A domestic defense production base allows for 
Japan to not just produce, but also sustain its assets.  Dependence on foreign sources for 
logistical support and training  is reduced.  Perhaps m ost importantly, it creates an 
economic incentive for m aintaining defense production.  To assert that a defense 
industrial base is critical to norm alized security m ay be an overstatem ent, but its 
existence is consistent from what one might expect to see in a normalized state. 
 By the end of the 1950’s, the basic for ce structure of the JS DF and a supporting 
defense industrial base had been established.  While this establishes that a credible force  
was raised, it does not speak to either concep t of e mployment or doctrine.  One of the  
more telling indicators of this is found in the Mitsuya exercises of 1963.  These exercises 
were intended to deter mine what def ensive measures would be required in the event of 
renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula.  These exercises had a significant im pact in 
that they re vealed a signif icant rif t between  civilian and  m ilitary d efense plan ners.  
Further, they also displayed a decidedly a ggressive approach which included bringing 
nuclear weapons into Japan and using them.21   
It was reaso ned that in the even t of renewed K orean conflict the Soviet Union 
would enter and Jap an would f ace a full scale assault.  Th e use of nuclear weapon s was 
considered as a m eans of defending Japan. 22 W hile this  pro ved shockin g to som e and  
created s ignificant public and po litical angst, it highlights the point  that Japan does not 
interpret the constitution as prohibiting nuclear weapons.  As  the JSDF is allowed to 
maintain the m inimum force requ ired for self-defense, there are circum stances in which 
                                                 





nuclear weapons m ay be perm issible.  This interpretation was initially  voiced by  Prime 
Minister Nobusuke Kishi in 1958, and again in th e 1970’s when the Tanaka adm inistration 
asserted that the use of nuclear warheads on defensive weapons would be constitutional.23  
It bears mention that Japan’s three Non-Nuclear Principles, stating that Japan will not 
“possess no r m anufacture nuclear weapons, nor shall it perm it their introduction into  
Japanese territory” is not a constitutional interpretation, but rather a policy choice.24  While a 
nuclear Japan would un doubtedly generate an adverse public response, the  salient factor is 
that Japan has delinked nuclear weapons from  the constitutional debate.  Further, as its  
regional neighbors are quick to point out, Japan’s domestic H-2 rocket can readily be adapted 
to launch nu clear warhea ds, Japa n is able to obtain large amounts of plu tonium from its  
domestic nuclear power plants, and the majority  of the JSDF’s weaponry  can be used as a 
nuclear or n on-nuclear delivery  m eans.25 If we co nsider this in the contex t of a securit y 
normalization trend, within the first twenty years of its existen ce Japan has set the phy sical 
and legal conditions to become a nuclear power. 
While the Mitsu ya exe rcises were highly controversial in t he 1960 s, b y the 197 0s 
similar evolutions opera ted publicly and prompted no significant opposition.  Japanese 
concerns over the Soviet Union led to the reali zation that security  issues were better ser ved 
by reality than ideology.  This attitude is perhaps best reflected in a public statement made by 
Defense Agency director general Shin Kanemaru, “Some say the Self-Defense Forces must 
not present any threat to foreign nations, but what kind of defense is it if it does not threaten 
enemies?”26 This was echoed by  Gro und SDF general Hiroom i Kurisu, who noted that  
“…the history  of war shows that only  offense can win.  We cannot effectively  respond to 
offensive actions that po se a threat fro m outside Ja pan’s sphere through defensive m easures 
alone.”27 Collectively, the voices of the director and at least one senior officer suggest a far 
more bellicose tone than is found in the peace constitution. 
                                                 







As the 1970s cam e to an end, the hawkish views of that era’s leadership were 
bolstered from abroad.  The Soviet Union’ s 1979 invasion of Afghani stan coupled with 
Ronald Reagan’s declaration of an evil em pire and Japan’s econom ic growth served to 
expand the scale of JSDF exercises and the res ources available to it.  Further, the JSDF 
found a strong advocate in Prim e Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who famously referred to 
Japan as “an unsinkable aircraft  carrier,” strongly implying support to U.S. forces in case 
of conflict with the Soviet Union.  Under Nakasone’s lead ership, Japan em barked on a 
defense buildup that quickly exceeded the nom inal 1% of GNP lim it that had previously 
constrained defense spending.  Japan participated  regularly with U.S. forces in com bined 
exercises and technological exchanges with the U.S. occurred regularly.28  As the eighties 
ended, however, the Cold War came to an end and new questions emerged. 
With the swift decline o f Soviet military forces in the 1990s , a moment of peace 
emerged in which the r ationale for the JSDF was challenged at a point in tim e when it 
had grown into a m ilitary with the third la rgest defense budget in the world.  The JSDF 
collectively had almost as many tanks as Grea t Britain, a world-class coastal navy, more 
Patriot missiles than I srael, and a f ormidable number of  F-15 strike a ircraft and AEGIS  
cruisers.  Moreover, Japan’s defense industry was able to produce the m ajority of this 
hardware domestically.29  The challenge, though, was what to do with it.  In the search 
for a new direction, two new fut ures were considered.  The first involved increased 
participation in UN pea cekeeping a ctivities and the othe r was to f ocus on the thr eat 
potential of a nuclear North Korea, both of which are consistent with observable trends in 
the JSDF today.30  
The first fifty years of the JSDF’s existence provide considerable insight into how 
the Japan ese have his torically con sidered the  f orce.  This is no teworthy in th at it 
establishes a broad trend of past behaviors that may portend future actions.  Based on the 
evidence presented in the preceding paragraphs, the following are key events that support 
                                                 





the view of the JSDF as a having the type of offensive potential that may be observed in a 
normalized force: 
a) MacArth ur’s edict to  create the force was predicated on  the vacuum left by 
U.S. forces deployed to Korea.  From  the outset Japan’s defense force was 
envisioned as a military organization. 
b) Japan’s deployment of naval assets in support of U.S. actions in Korea absent 
public knowledge indicate an early willingness to deploy forces when deem ed 
necessary and without open discussion.  
c) The establishm ent of a dom estic de fense industry capable of designing and 
producing advanced weaponry would seem  to indicate a state seeking eventual 
defense autonomy and a qualitative advantage over all contenders. 
d) The size of the force, while small in comparison to regional neighbors, is offset 
by the destructive potential facilitated through adva nced weapons technology.  
Size lim itations, while politically palatabl e, cannot be considered as the m ost 
significant variable in assessing force ratios. 
e) The resp ective pub lic statem ents of senior officers, defense directors, and  
Prime Ministers imply an internal perception of the JSDF has f illing an offensive 
role should circumstance dictate. 
e) W hile th e th ree non -nuclear prin ciples a re in tentionally r e-assuring, they ar e 
equally non -binding.  The early willingne ss to conduct exercises th at involv e 
nuclear options, the nuclear potential re sident within Japan, and the asserted 
legality of nuclear weapons should defens e potential warrant it necessary im ply a 
much greater official acceptance of nuclear  options than would be expected from  
a pacifist state. 
f) The force build-up during the Nakasone regime was consistent with a force that 
was preparing for open conflict with the So viet Union.  In order to do so, the 
JSDF would have to possess offensive poten tial.  This  implies the creation of an 
offensive force restricted only by policy and not capability.   
 30
Collectively, these factors suggest that th e intended role of the JSDF ha s always 
been that of  a regular military.  From the out set, it has been  structured and trained as a 
military force.  Moreover, the Japanese governm ent has demonstrated a consistent ability 
to de-link key advancements in the force away from the constitution.  Given the build-up 
during the Nakasone era, the offensive potential of the force cannot credibly be denied.  It 
can reasona bly be concluded that J apan has built an of fensive appar atus capab le of  
projecting force, em ploying combined arms, and directly engaging with enem ies.  The 
only evidence to the contrary is that Japan ha s retained the m oniker of defense for ces.  
The following section  exam ines the curren t JSDF, which offers m ore evidence of a  
seemingly normalized force.  
3. The Contemporary JSDF 
The origins  of the JSDF have set condition s f or the f orce that exis ts today.  
Recognizing that the security  environm ent of the Cold W ar has long since ended, the 
JSDF has been resh aped to m eet new defense requirements.  One aspect of this is the 
development of a Central Readiness Force ( CRF), which w as established in 2007 as a 
"mixture of special forces, aerial transpor tation, anti-NBC warfare and military training 
units" intended to support operations on a m ore global scale. 31  This shif t, reflecting the 
changes set forth in the 2005 National Defe nse Program  guidelines, m ark an ongoing 
trend towards a higher level of  more direct military involvement in global crises.  This 
shift in  focus has b een further reinforced  by  recen t s tatements from  current Prim e 
Minister Yasuo Fakuda, who stated  in March 2008 that  he intends to in troduce a bill that 
will allow the JSDF to m ore deploy troops abroad. 32  Japan currently has to pass 
temporary laws for each proposed overseas mission. 
In addition to revised roles, there have also been significant structural changes 
within the Defense Agency, most notable its promotion to a full ministry.  The 2006 Law 
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on the Establishm ent of the Defense Agency passed by a wide m argin and promptl y 
elevated its status.  The newly established position Minister for Defens e carries with it 
the authority to subm it bills and convene cab inet m eetings, assum ing roles prev iously 
held by the prim e minister.  Also of note, this  change allows the Ministry of Defense to 
present its own budget. 33 This final point bears m ention as it rem oves the long 
withstanding, and seemingly arbitrary, 1% of  GNP cap that has long constrained defense  
spending.  Conceptually, this allows the Minister for Defense to submit budgets based on 
requirements and not a highly politicized and self-imposed cap. 
The Ground Self De fense Force (GSDF) has al so been restructured to m eet more 
contemporary security concerns.  Manpower le vels have stabilized  at approximately 
155,000 personnel, but there have been considerab le changes in term s of force structure 
and equipment reflecting an increased em phasis on terrorist response, peacekeeping, and  
non-conventional warfare.  The m ost notable m anifestations of this  are the reduction of 
two infantry divisions, reducing the number of main battle tanks from 900 to 600, and the 
refinement of the aforementioned Central Readiness Force.34 
The Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) remains the m ost prominent element 
of the JSDF.  Its current strength of 43,000 sail ors, nearly three tim es its original size, 
reflects its increasing importance in Japanese  security.  Its prim ary m ission, to defend 
Japan from maritime invasion and s ecure the safety of maritim e traffic around Japan, is 
virtually unchanged since its  inception.  Additionally, thou gh, are a host of expanded 
missions emphasizing "effective response to ne w threats and diverse situations," and 
meeting "signif icant ch anges in th e security e nvironment resulting f rom the incre ased 
proliferation of weapons of mass de struction and ballis tic missiles and  the activities of 
international terrorist organizations."35 
Expressed a bit m ore explicitly, th e MSDF is in the m idst of preparing itself  for 
five specif ic challenge s: ballis tic m issile attacks, attacks  by special operations  units, 
                                                 




invasion of the Japanese islands, warning and surveillance in maritime areas and airspace 
surrounding Japan, and a response to large, extr aordinary disasters.  Also e mphasized is 
the need to participate in "co-operative activities to maintain international peace," such as 
minesweeping operations.  Regarding this latter emphasis, in 2006 the MSDF deployed to 
Iraq where it conducted hum anitarian and reconstruction operations, with over 300 
MSDF personnel being employed in theatre.36 
The modern Air Self Defense Force (A SDF), over 40,000 strong, is tasked with 
the “air def ense of Japan and support of la nd and naval forces as required.”  T hese 
intended roles are centered on the ability to provide early warning surveillance and rapid 
reaction, which manifests itself in an array of  interceptor aircraft, multi-purpose fighters, 
early warning aircraft, and a significant air defense network.  In addition to this, there has 
been a recent em phasis on i mproving air suppor t to land forces.  Also of note is  the  
prominent role that Japanese Airborne  W arning and Control System  (AWACS)  
capabilities play in coordinating missile defense activity.37 
When collectively considered, the JSDF has all of the trappings of what one might 
expect to f ind in any modern m ilitary.  It m aintains three branches of service and by  all 
outward appearances is what one would consider to be a normal military.  Despite this, its 
defensive character is repeatedly emphasized.  The ensuing problem is that if the JSDF is 
not discernibly defensive and if the assets it is comprised of harbor an offensive potential, 
can it objectively be considered a defensiv e f orce?  T o reso lve this ques tion, the 
following section will consider the JSDF in comparison to a recognized, normal military.   
4. The JSDF in Comparison 
As stated previously, normalization is an  elusive term which, f or the purpose of 
this thesis, is considered as the capac ity and willingness to em ploy m ilitary force in 
pursuit of national objectives.  Arguably, one of the m ore effe ctive ways of 
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demonstrating the degree to which the JSDF ha s normalized is to con sider it aga inst a 
normal force.  To achie ve this, th e JSDF will be com pared against the United King dom 
(UK), which by all po pular accou nts, functio ns in  a m anner one would expect of a 
normalized m ilitary.  While it is  recogn ized that both countries h ave sign ificantly 
different security concerns, the in tent is to d emonstrate the degre e to which Ja pan 
resembles a norm alized f orce.   The basis f or com parison will enco mpass def ense 
spending, organization, force structure, the resp ective branches of the service, and force 
deployments. 
With m ilitary spend ing at $53 (US) bi llion in  2008, Japan is the fifth larg est 
spender in the world. 38   In contrast, the UK spent $79(US) billion in 2008, and has the 
second highest defense budget in the world. 39 Of course, as single f igures they offer little 
insight into the m eaningful, qualita tive aspect s o f the respec tive forces.  W hat they do 
provide, however, is a means of expressing Japan’s defense spending.  More specifically, 
as a country with an espoused defensive posture it spent ~65% as much on military forces 
as did a state with a norm alized force.  This  figure shifts to ~70% when Japan’s Coast 
Guard, which has adop ted some military roles, is also considered.  Suf fice it to s ay that 
while Japan’s defense spending is considerab ly less than th e UK, it ca n be cons idered 
comparable. 
The intuitiv e question that f ollows def ense spe nding is ho w it is spen t.  In the  
broadest of term s, this fiscal po sture afford the UK a force  of nearly 190,000 m ilitary 
personnel, 386 tanks, 319 fighter aircraft, 3 aircraft carriers, and 8 destroyers.  In contrast, 
Japan fields a force of 240,000 personnel, 980 tanks, 338 fighter aircraft, and 43 
destroyers.40  While it is recognized that this is far from  a comprehensive com parison of 
the respective forces, it should be rem embered that it is not intended to be.  The purpose 
of this very superf icial treatment is sim ply to illustra te that absent any other data to the 
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contrary the  JSDF bears a strik ing quantita tive resem blance to one of  the world’s  
foremost militaries.  This will be an alyzed in more sc rutiny as th is section is developed, 
but for now it is reasonable to assert that a partial comparison of the UK’s military forces 
and the JSDF are comparable. 
To develop  this line  of  reasonin g f urther, the com parative o rganizational 
structures need to be investigated.  In the case of the UK the Ministry of Defense 
constitutes the highest level military headquarters.  The Ministry of Defense is run by the 
Secretary of State for Defense who, in a ddition to exercising political control over 
military operations, is responsible for Defense policy.  In addition to his junior ministers, 
they are als o three serv ice comm anders, each of whom  exercis e com mand over their 
respective s ervices.  Given the co mplexity of  joint oper ations, a p ermanent joint 
headquarters consisting of all branches of  service was established to provide early 
warning assessm ents and m onitor crisis areas that may be of interest to the UK.  The 
following figure depicts the top-level structure of the UK’s Ministry of Defense.41 
 
 
Figure 1.   Organization of the UK Ministry of Defense (From: 39) 
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When we com pare the organization  of th e UK Minis try of Defense against the 
JSDF, there  are  again  n oteworthy sim ilarities.  In th is c ase the Ministe r of  Def ense is  
supported b y three chiefs of staff, each of  whom  have responsibility  for the gro und, 
maritime, and air self defense forces.   The respective service chiefs collectively comprise 
a Joint Staff Council which is chaired by a se nior officer.  The joint staff counsel was  
restructured in the early 80s to establish strong lines of comm unications between the 
respective services.  Also of note is that pr ior to 2007 the Ministry of Defense had been a 
Defense Agency, subordinated as a Cabinet office with considerably less influence in the 
Japanese government.42  Elevating th e status of the Defe nse Agency to a full m inistry is 
consistent with the theory that the JSDF ha s experienced a steady grow th trend, in this  
case m anifesting itself as a significantly in creased degree of governm ent prom inence.  
The following figure depicts the top-level st ructure of the Japanese Ministry of 
Defense.43 
 
Figure 2.   Organization of Japan’s Ministry of Defense (From: 43) 
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What becom es abunda ntly apparent is the striking sim ilarity between their 
respective structures, which for all intents and purposes are mirror images of each other.  
While it m ay be tem pting to asser t that the s imilarity is clear p roof of  a norm alized 
Japanese force, there are som e very obvious  counters.  F rom the outset the JSDF was 
established along functional lines,  meaning that it had  a respectiv e ground maritime and 
air force.  T he aggregating of like capabilities is an in tuitively logical way to struc ture 
any organization.  Succinctly, th e com parable s tructures of the UK’s m ilitary and the 
JSDF prove nothing wh ile still serv ing as a  positive indicator that the Japanese military 
is, by all outward appearances, a normal force. 
As m ight be expected,  the sim ilarities do not stop the re.  Beginning  with the  
respective ground forces, the UK has 105,000 regular  personnel organized into infantry 
battalions, arm or regiments, arm ored reconnais sance regiments, artillery regim ents, air 
defense regiments, engineer regiments, aviation regiments, signals regiments, and special 
forces.  The policy gu idance for the ground forc es represents the UK’s strategic reality.   
In a post-Cold War era, the UK views itself as having a greater range of m issions than in 
past times.  W hile national survival is le ss of  an issue, m odern threats tend to b e more 
complex and varied.  This reflected in UK defense policy which is centered on the 
following p rinciples: e nsuring the  secur ity of  the  UK and its  c itizens in  peace time, 
ensuring the security of dependent territori es, providing defense support to the country' s 
wider interests, supporting international order and hum anitarian principles under UN 
auspices, being prepared for regional conflict outside North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and being prepared for a NATO regional crisis and a general war.44 
Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force cons ists of 155,000 regular personnel.  The  
force is organized into armor and infantry divisions, airborne brigades, artillery brigades, 
air def ense brigades,  heliborne  brigades,  engineer brigades, a ntitank he licopter 
squadrons, and special operations forces.  The force is gu ided by overarching defense 
policy.  The prim ary ob jective is to  preven t any threat from reaching Japan and  in the 
event that it does repel it a nd minimize damage.  The second obj ective is to contribute to 
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the improvement of the global security envi ronment to reduce the likelihood of a threat 
reaching J apan.  This will be don e through cooperation with the U.S. and the broader 
international community.  Japan will suppor t U N activities supporting global stability.  
One of the notable differences is that Japa n makes it very clear point of asserting the  
defensive nature of its force highlighting its “modest” nature and civilian control.45 
When placed side-by-side, the numbers are ag ain com parable.  Moreo ver, th e 
functional c apabilities r etained with in both the UK and Japan are highly sim ilar, with 
differences that are argu ably best explained by regional security concerns.  However, it 
should be noted that despite sim ilar functi onal elem ents the type units are very and 
unique to their respective countri es.  W hat is meant by this is  that a Japanese artillery 
regiment is not a direct m irror of a UK artillery  Regiment.    W hat is established is that 
Japan’s strictly defensive force as essentially the same functional capabilities as the UK’s 
normalized force.  The follo wing figure presents a side- by-side comparison of the  
functional capabilities of the respective forces. 
 
 United Kingdom Japan
Force Size 105,000 155,000
Main Battle Tanks 386 980
Self-Propelled Howitzer 179 250
Towed Howitzer 119 480
MLRS 63 1000
Attack Helicopter 0 4
Combat Helicopter 127 83  
Figure 3.   Comparison of UK and Japanese Ground Forces (From: 31,39) 
What is f ar m ore illu minating is  the relativ e lack  of  c ontrast be tween their 
respective defense policies.  In both cases in the primary reason for existence is to defend 
the homeland.  Further, both have indicated that they will support operations in support of 
global stability working in concert with the UN.  The two distinct differences are that the 
UK’s policy reflects its NAT O co mmitment a nd that Jap an has asserted its defensive 
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nature.  W hile th e f ormer dif ference is re adily explained as a state s pecific reg ional 
security issue, the latter is  a far more dubious claim .  When considered against the 
evidence presented thus far what we see is  that Japan is organized very sim ilarly to th e 
UK, its ground force is 30% larger, and th e overarching defense policy is virtually 
identical with the excep tion of the Japanese asse rtion that their force is defensive.  In the 
context of the evidence presented thus far this is not fully convincing.   
The comparisons of the respective air for ces bear out this em erging trend.  The  
UK m aintains an air force of nearly 46,000 pe rsonnel.  T hese personnel collectively 
operate a fleet of aircraft consisting of multi -role fighters, air defe nse fighters, striking 
ground attack fighters, m aritime patrol, airbor ne early warning and control, and tanker 
transport functions.  These aircraft are or ganized into three broad groups, under which 
our squadrons typically consisting of three to four  subordinate units referred to as flights.  
Additionally, the Royal Air Force ( RAF) is al so able to organize and expeditionary air 
wings to b etter f acilitate swif t dep loyment.  As m ight be expected,  th e RAF has been 
highly involved in operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.46 
The Japanese Air Self -Defense Force (ASDF) is com parable in s ize with  
approximately 45,000 airmen.   It also possesses multi-role fighters, interceptors, airborne 
early warning and control, reconnaissance airc raft, and tanker transport platforms.  These 
personnel in assets are organized into ei ght aircraft control m orning groups, nine 
interceptor squadrons, three fighter squa drons, one reconnaissance squadron, three 
transport squadrons.  The ASDF also contains  surface to air m issile groups.  While a bit  
less am bitious in scope then the R AF, the ASDF has recently supported operation s in 
Cambodia, Mozam bique, Rwanda, Kuwait, and Iraq. 47 The ASDF has adapted tactical 
doctrine f rom the U.S. Air Force to  f it in Ja pan’s vision of a defensive force.  Also of 
note is the high degree of cooperation and trai ning that the ASDF conducts with the U.S. 
Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. 
As we exam ine the RAF and ASDF the tren d continues.   Both air forces are 
comparable in size and possess aircraft with a high degree of functi onal similarity.  In 
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addition to this both have been rather extensively involved in operations across the globe.  
The degree of training that ASDF conducts with U.S. forces also bears em phasis.  
Accepting that Japan has adapted U.S. doctrin e for strictly d efensive purposes, by v irtue 
of having trained fairly routinely with the U.S. in a variety of venues it can reasonably be 
expected that the ASDF has been exposed to  num erous offensive roles.  Moreover, a 
distinction between offense and defense in aerial com bat and close air support is 
somewhat of a dubious claim .  Thes e are competencies that one would find to expect in 
either an aggressive air force or a purely defensive one.  
 A final point for consideration between th e respective air forces is the num ber of 
fighter aircraft owned by each of the forces as depicted in the following figure.  On a 
purely quantitative basis Japan possesses a significantly larger number of combat aircraft.  
Considered in aggregate, both the n ormalized and defensive force are com parable in size 
and function, both have recently deployed in albeit in different capacities, and the defense 
to f orce m aintains a lar ger quantity  of  f ighter aircraft and  the norm alized one.  Our 
examination of the air f orces again suggests that the two are com parable to the degree 
that there is no discernible difference. 
 
United Kingdom Japan
Force Size 45,550 44,775
Fighter - Multirole 33 78
Fighter - Interceptor / Air Defense 75 260
Fighter - Ground Attack / Strike 211 0
Reconnaissance / Surveillance 0 26
Transport 53 47
Signals Intelligence 10 6
Trainer 357 311  
 
Figure 4.   Comparison of UK and Japanese Air Forces (From: 31, 39) 
The final branches of service to be considered are the two navies of the respective 
countries.  As island nations is not surprising that both would place a prem ium on a 
strong naval force.  In the case of the UK’s Royal Navy, there ar e nearly 40,000 regular 
personnel m anning som e thirteen subm arines, three aircraft carr iers, one helicopter 
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carrier, to assault ships,  seventeen  frigates , eight destroyers, and sixteen m ine warfare 
vessels.  The Royal Na vy also encom passes the Royal Marines of which there is one 
brigade.  A dditionally there are twelve na val aviation squadrons.  Following the Cold 
War, the R oyal Navy saw significant shift in  o perational roles wh ich now consists of 
eight primary defense missions.   It is charg ed with peacetime secu rity functions such as 
fisheries protection and the security of o il and gas platform s, supporting operations in 
overseas po ssessions, security and confidence building program s, pe ace support an d 
humanitarian operations, and regional conflicts within and external to the NATO alliance.  
The Royal Navy m aintains a reasonably high  deploym ent profile, having conducted 
recent operations in the Mediterranean, No rth Atlantic,  South Atlantic, Iraq,  and 
Afghanistan.48 
The Japan Maritim e Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has 43,000 sailors who operate 
and maintain a fleet of 20 subm arines, 43 destroyers, 12 frigates, and 35 m ine warfare 
ships.  Of  all of  Japan’s forces it is consid ered to be the m ost important and powerf ul, 
charged with the protection of Japanese wate rs and in providing m aritime security.  To 
achieve these functions  the MSDF has deve loped a high degree of com petency and anti-
submarine warfare, an ti-air warfare, anti-s urface warfare, m ine warfare, electronic 
warfare, surveillance, transpor t, and search and  rescue.   These skills  have been d eemed 
necessary to support an expanded role agains t “new threats and di verse situations.”  
These new threats have focused MSDF effort s on been prepared to respond to ballistic 
missile attacks, attacks by guerrillas, an inva sion of the Japanese islands, intrusion upon 
Japanese maritime areas or airspace,  and res ponding to natural disasters.  MSDF sailors 
recently deployed to Iraq and chip s of regularly been dispa tched to th e Indian Ocean  in 
support of counterterrorism operations.49 
The two navies present both high degree of  similarity and a f ew points of  stark 
contrast.  B oth are co mparable in  size a nd p ossess sim ilar typ es of naval assets in  
significantly different numbers.   The glaring difference is that the Royal Navy maintains 
aircraft carriers and the MSDF has considerably more destroyers and mine warfare ships.  
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That Japan maintains such a large num ber of destroyers and minesweepers intuitively reflect 
the practical reality of assembling a force that will enable freedom of navigation in the region 
given m ultiple chokepoints.  Interpreting Japan’ s lack of a ircraft carriers is a bit more 
difficult. 
Aircraft carriers clearly  provide a means of projecting force well off one ’s own  
shores.  Given this it is reasonable to construe the existence of a  carrier as being offensive in 
nature.  In  the case of Jap an the absen ce of a carri er may limit global po wer projection, but 
this is regionally  offset by  the large quantity  of destroyers.  Expressed in a regional context, 
Japan constitutes what form er Japanese Prim e Minister Nakasone referred to as “ an 
unsinkable aircraft carrier” protected by this large quantity of destroyers.  This would suggest 
that the Japanese absence  of aircraft c arriers may be of limited relevance in projecting force  
within the region.  While it would be difficult to argue that the existence of Japanese aircraft 
carriers would be for any thing other than offense of purposes, the lack thereof has little 
bearing in considering the degree of normalization in the existing force.  In the final analysis, 
although the Roy al Na vy and the MSDF do have som e disparate capabilities they  are 
outweighed by the num ber of sim ilarities.  The following figure highlights the pri mary 
disparities between the two. 
 United Kingdom Japan
Force Size 38,550 43,300
Submarines - Strategic Missile 4 0
Submarines - Attack 8 18
Aircraft Carrier 3 0
Destroyer 8 43
Frigate 17 8
Minesweeper 17 35  
Figure 5.   Comparison of UK and Japanese Naval Forces (From: 31, 39) 
 
The preceding paragraphs have provided evidenc e that Japan’ s Self-Defense Force s 
are virtually indiscernible from the forces of a normalized state that is widely acknowledged 
as having a competent a nd skilled military .  The organizational structures, the num ber of 
personnel, war fighting functions, and types of assets are each highly comparable.  While this 
constitutes a reasonable am ount of d ata to support claim s that Japan’ s forces are tren ding 
towards normalization one other aspect will be considered.  One of the forem ost domestic 
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and external issues surrounding the JSDF i s their deployment beyond Japan’s borders.  This 
tends to represent one of two points of view, the first is th at deploy ing troops abro ad 
constitutes an act of aggression in the second is that today’ s security cont ext m ay require 
action abroad to defend Japan.  In con tinuing our comparative analysis the question becomes 
to what extent are elements of the JSDF deployed and is this consistent wit h what we might 
see in a nor malized force such as found in the UK.  The following figure s depict recent UK 
and Japanese force deployment profiles.50,51 
 
Figure 6.   Recent UK Force Deployments (From: 50) 
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Figure 7.   Recent JSDF Deployments (From: 51) 
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The preceding the figures illus trate som e surprising sim ilarities.  The UK has 
nearly 41,000 personnel deployed in vari ous locations.  Japa n has nearly 30,000 
personnel deployed in a very sim ilar fashion.  This gap shrinks c onsiderably when you 
extricate the UK’s 21,000 personne l who are permanently stationed in Germany.  This is 
an im portant distinctio n as this r eflects basing strategy rather than an operational  
deployment.  W hen viewed through this lens , Japan has one and a half tim es as m any 
forces deployed as the UK.  Considered on a strictly numerical basis, Japan’s operational 
commitments appear quite comparable to that of the normalized UK.   
Another significant difference that bears mention is the number of forces that the 
UK has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.  While Japan has forces deployed to these 
areas, they are in  significantly smaller quantity.  The debate over the role in which they 
are serving is certainly relevant, and while Japan may not be committing frontline combat 
troops, it is undeniable that they have esta blished a significant gl obal footprint well 
beyond Japan’s dom estic borders.  Further, the distinction betw een com batant and 
noncombatant is increasingly narrow in m any conflict areas.  JS DF personnel deployed 
overseas in any capacity coul d easily find them selves unde r attack and very quickly 
become the front line.  The relevant point re mains that for a force developed strictly for  
the defense of Japan, the JSDF has cultivated a significant global presence. 
To be clear,  the inten t of this an alysis has not been to determ ine whether or not 
UK forces are superio r to JSDF, but rath er to demonstrate that the latter bears a strik ing 
resemblance to an accepted, normalized force.  Based on the factors of organization, size,  
capability, and deployments it becom es apparent  that the s imilarities heavily outw eigh 
the differences.  The most recurrin g contrast is the d egree to which the  JSDF asser ts its 
defensive nature.  This contra st is significantly reduced wh en the roles and m issions of 
the respective forces are cons idered.  Th e UK has very  clearly established tha t th e 
primary purpose of  its f orces is to  protect UK property a nd citiz enry, which inf ers a  
heavily defensive role without characterizing it self as a defe nsive force.  By continually 
asserting its  defensive role in the f ace of  these similarities, Japan draws a great deal of 
attention to the offensive potential of the JSDF. 
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Note that while this cha pter has emphasized the relative similarities between the 
JSDF and UK forces, a broader analysis furt her reinforces Japan’s normalization trend.  
Considered along the dim ensions of defense spending, air p ower, and n aval capabilities 
Japan com pares favorab ly on an in ternational s cale.52  The f ollowing f igures illus trate 
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Figure 10.   Relative Naval Capabilities (From: 52) 
 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding analys is has allowed  us to  cons ider multiple f acets of  the JSDF, 
from which certa in conclusions can be drawn.  If the path towards a m odern military is 
considered as a trend line with a starting point of pacifism  and an endpoint of an 
integrated sea, air, and land force capable of  quickly deploying to m ultiple locations, it 
becomes apparent th at the JSDF has steadily advanced alo ng this axis.   If this path is  
characterized as security norm alization, it is still apparent that the JSD F has progressed 
significantly since its inception as a police reserve.  The emerging question becom es one 
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of what will be th e next sign ificant m ilestone on this assum ed path to wards 
normalization.  The answer to this is found in pa rt under the broad rubric of m issile 
defense. 
The introduction of  missile defense enta ils far more than sim ply shooting down 
missiles.  To such an in itiative a viable counter, significant changes have had to be made  
to Japan ’s defense app aratus.  Th ese chan ges span legal,  tech nical, and operational 
domains.  The f ollowing chapter will iden tify the scope of the changes associa ted with 
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III. ENTER MISSILE DEFENSE 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE MISSILE DEFENSE 
In the p revious chapter a trend  line towards Japanese security norm alization was 
developed.  From its origins as a police re serve to a capable  military force serving in a 
global capacity, the JSDF has quite clea rly m oved well beyond its origin.  The  
subsequent question is what direction Japanese security will take from this point on.  The 
answer to this is found in part in Japan’s m issile defense initiative.  W hile it is simple to 
conceive of missile defense is sim ply a “poi nt and shoot” system , the reality is far more 
complex.  To im plement missile defense Japan had to introduce a significant number of 
security milestones that when taken collec tively advance the norm alization trend.  Thi s 
chapter will delineate key milestones in the development of Japanese missile defense and 
identify specific elements that have broader implications. 
From the Japanese point of view, th e “BMD system  is the only an d purely 
defensive measure, with out alte rnatives, to protect lif e and  property of  the citiz ens of 
Japan again st ballistic m issile atta cks, and meets the principle of exclusively defense-
oriented national defense policy.” 53 Others take a far dimm er view, suggesting that the 
capabilities associa ted with m issile def ense provide may in fact provide Japan with an 
offensive capacity.  Ultim ately, th e issue of  all of fensive or def ensive capab ility is  
relegated to perception.  However, what can be  treated as fact is that J apan is clearly 
pursuing missile defense. 
The Japanese m issile defense program ha s steadily progressed since the concept 
was introduced in the m id-1980s.  From its inception, it has gained  budgetary support, 
overcome technical hurdles, and has experienced several successful test events.   Th is is 
not m eant t o im ply tha t it has developed with out incident.  Cost, technical risk, and  
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12 May 2008. 
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impacts on the regional balance of power have each p rompted some degree of internal 
and external dissent.  None of these factor s, however, have proven substantive enough to 
halt development.    
The Japanese commitment to missile defense can largely be attributed to its long-
standing security relationship with the U.S. a nd the potential missile threat from both the  
People’s Republic of China and, more prom inently, North Korea.  In the context of the 
U.S., Japanese interest in m issile defense programs dates from the m id-1980s, when the 
Department of Defense solicited participation by allied countries in the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (S DI). Japan declin ed to participate but did part ly relax arm s export bans to 
facilitate sharing technology with the U.S. Subsequently, Japan shared technology with 
the U.S. for several weapons system s, incl uding surface to air m issile system s, ship 
construction, rocket engines, and fighter aircraft.54 
This collaboration proved highly frustratin g to all parties as technology transfer 
issues had become entwined in the U.S.-Japan trade deficit issues.  While this resulted in 
an inc reased Japanes e aversion  to  join t deve lopment with the U.S.,  m issile de fense 
studies continued through the early  1990’s.  To this end, Japan and the U.S. initiated a 
missile defense system  study under the SDI in itiative entitled W estern Pacific Basin 
Architecture Study.  Following the com pletion of the study in October 1994, a “Bilateral 
Study on BMD” was conducted to better understand the ballis tic m issile threat and to 
study alternative architectures.55  
Despite pre-existing missile threats, North Korea’s test firing of its Taepo Dong 
ballistic missile in August 1998 prompted a m uch more concerted effort by the U.S. and 
Japan.  This event clearly illustrated Japan’s vulnerability to North Korea’s missile threat 
and drew public concern about the country’s vulnerability to m issile attacks.  In 
December 1998, the Japanese governm ent made an internal decision to engage with  the 
U.S. in cooperative research and development of a ballistic missile defense system.56  
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Today, all indications a re that Jap an is committed to this c ourse of action and is 
doing quite well in achieving it.  T he following is a brief synopsis illustrating Japanese  
progress and commitment towards missile defense:57,58 
 
1990: North Korea test launches ballistic missile into the Sea of Japan 
1992: Bush administration proposes Japanese TMD deployment  
1993: Started consultations with the U.S. on BMD 
1993: Japan purchases Aegis combat systems 
1993: North Korea test launches for ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan 
1994: Japan and South Korea agreed to cooperate on North Korean missile 
threat 
1995: JDA commenced BMD feasibility study  
1998: Japan-U.S. Cooperative Research Project approved by the Security 
Council of Japan and the Cabinet. 
1998: North Korea test launches ballistic missile over Japan 
2002: Japan-U.S. Defense Summit meeting  
2003: Japan launches IGS satellites 
2003: Japan-U.S. Defense Summit meeting 
2003: JDA requested BMD budget for FY 2004 
2003: GOJ decision to introduce BMD system 
2004: Japan and the U.S. signed BMD Framework MOU 2005: Japanese 
Diet concluded legislation for response to ballistic missile. 
2005: GOJ decision to start SM-3 Joint Cooperative Development  
2006: SM–3 Block IIA Cooperative Development Project started 
2007: Transition from Defense Agency to Ministry of Defense 
2007: PATRIOT PAC-3 deployed at Iruma Air Base - Japan’s first 
interceptor 
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2007: Successful completion of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 
(BMD) intercept flight test in Hawaii  
This tim eline illustrate s the d egree of  Japane se comm itment to the  program .   
What is perhaps less ex plicit are the security milestones that have been entrenched in  the 
pursuit of missile defense.  The following section will elaborate on what has had to occur 
to make missile defense a potential reality. 
B. THE ATTENDANT FEATURES OF MISSILE DEFENSE 
1. Command and Control 
Missile defense is an in herently complex activity.  In order  for it to be ef fective, 
there needs to be a  hig h degree  of  coordi nation between multiple  entitie s.  Expr essed 
differently, m issile defense requires  a fast  and  accurate comm and-and-control (C2) 
system.  In considering Japan’s post-Cold W ar C2 structure it quickly becom es apparent 
that far les s com plex m echanisms were suffi cient.  As m ight be expected, the JSDF 
developed along service lines oriented towards com plementing U.S. for ces.  During the 
Cold War era the U.S. was the deterrent ag ainst potential Soviet aggression, with Japan 
playing a secondary role.  W hile the JSDF did participate in combined exercises with the 
U.S., it was still within the conf ines of a single service channels.  As a result of  this there 
was never an im petus t o develop a trul y join t C2 structur e within the JSDF. 59  Wh en 
considering the demands of an effective m issile defense system, the shortcomings of this 
approach become readily apparent. 
Effective missile defen se presents  a far more substantial C2 challeng e.  The  
decision to deploy a m issile defense capability  is alm ost invariab ly predicated on the 
detection and dissem ination of early warning information.  In practical term s any asset 
detecting an indication of launch must be able to  pass that in formation to a platf orm that 
is capable of acting upon it.  This entails space-based system s, ground-based system s, 
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aerial systems, and sea-based system s.  Moreove r, given the benefits of interoperability 
with U.S. resources, there is a need to ensure that the C2 ap paratus can also function in a  
multi-national capacity.60 
This reality is reflected in Japanese defense planning.  Japan’s National Defense  
Program Guidelines have placed in increased  emphasis on effective jo int operations and  
increased command-and-control capabilities.  In def ining the critical elements of defense 
Japan has established the enhancem ent of joint opera tion capabilities  as a num ber on e 
priority.  The following extracts from Japa n’s 2007 Defense Planning Guidance illustrate 
the importance of the Japan places on these two elements: 
 
In order to have thr ee services of  the self -defense forces work integ rally 
and to enable them  to execute the ir missions swif tly and ef fectively, we  
will em ploy them  jointly whenever  po ssible.  W e will c reate a cen tral 
organization to f acilitate join t ope rations, and  es tablish inf rastructure for 
training and education as well as in telligence and communications.  In 
doing so, we will re -examine existing organizations so as to enhance the ir 
efficiency.61 
…in particu lar we will develop  th e comm and-and-control system s an d 
agile intelligence sharing system s that are indispens able for joint 
operations, and to inform ation and co mmunication technologies available  
at hom e and overseas.   In additio n, will cre ate advanced  system s f or 
command and communications in a network for infor mation and 
communications, with sufficient protection against possible cyber attacks, 
to enhance operational and organizational efficiency.62 
 
It is arguable that improved “jointness” and C2 systems could simply be attributed 
to the desire to be able to conduct m ore effective defense operations and that m issile 
defense was not a significant driver.  The count er to this is found in the sa me planning 
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guidance which addresses the m eans by which improvements will be im plemented.  The 
document highlights the close coordination between comm and-and-control system s as  
critical to effective m issile-defense.  Placed in the contex t of com bined Japanese-U.S. 
missile defense, Japan’s Air Defens e Command was designated for co-location with the 
U.S. Fifth Air Force at Yokoda air base in  order to strengthen coordination between 
missile def ense C2 ele ments and f acilitate th e shar ing o f relevant s ensor da ta.63 In 
addition to this, the s tructure of Japan’s missile defense encompasses space, air, sea, and 
ground assets so it is somewhat intuitive that they would need to effectively communicate 
across serv ice channels .  W hile this reali zation m ay have  occurred absent a m issile 
defense initiative, it is missile defense that made it imperative. 
When this evidence is p laced on  the norm alization trend  line, two facto rs s tand 
out.  The first is that C2 im provements have manifested themselves as a post-cold war 
adaptation to a regional threat.  The fact that the shift towards greater interoperability has 
occurred in response to a local concern im plies that Japan is increasing its ability to 
provide for its own defense which is a significant departure from complete reliance on the 
U.S. security umbrella.  The second factor is that the nature of the threat is missile attack 
from North Korea.  Given that the exogenous th reat is of a specific type, nam ely missile 
attack, the actions taken by Japan can be interpreted as steps to increase its organic ability 
to deter and defeat said attack. 
2. Decision-making Authority 
Command-and-control is not strictly a m atter of havi ng the right hardware.  
Effective C2 rests in part on well-established  lines of authority.  In th e case of Japan, 
missile defense has again proven to be the impetus to change long-standing policies.  The 
speed with which m issile attacks can occur coupled with their de structive potential 
prompt a requirement for swift decision-m aking.  To facilitate this, in 2005 the Japanese 
Diet rev ised the Self-D efense Forces Law through the add ition of Article 82 -2.  The 
following is the applicable excerpt: 
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… in case that a ballistic m issile, etc.  is flying toward the land of Japan 
without suf ficient tim e to obtain aut horization stipulat ed in the same  
paragraph from the Prime Minister due to urgent changes of the situation, 
the Defense Minister m ay order the un its of th e Self-Defense Forces of 
Japan to take m easures stipulated in  the sam e paragraph in advance in 
order to prevent the dam ages on t he liv es and/or propert ies of citizens 
within the territory  of  Japan f ollowing Em ergency Response Guidelines  
that are prepared by th e Defense Mi nister and authorized by the Prime  
Minister.  In this case the Defense Minister shall set the period during 
which the ordered measures are to be implemented.64 
  
Despite the intuitive necessity and exceed ingly cautious wo rding, Article 82-2 is 
noteworthy in that it allows the Defense Minister to respond to the immediate threat 
absent a governm ent order for defe nsive action.  To expand the context, this is the first 
time since World War II that such authority has been delegated.65 
While the establishment of a Defense Minister and the delegation of this degree of 
authority are som ewhat profound in their own ri ght, it is o f limited utility in cond itions 
are not o therwise se t f or swif t execution of his order.  As alluded to in the pre ceding 
section, to defend against ballistic missiles all branches of the JSDF must cycle through a 
complex set of procedures.  It is necessary to  detect, track, classify, and identify targets.  
It is necessary to make a decision o n whether to  intercept or not and if  so to execute  the 
interception.  It is necessary to assess the results and make a subsequent determination on 
interception.  It is necessary to  co nfine damage from  debris in case of a successful  
intercept an d for m issile im pact in  the case of an interce pt f ailure.  These ac tivities 
collectively require that all branches of the JSDF work in concert. 
To facilitate the des ired synergy, at the same time Japan add ed Article 8 2 – 2 to  
the Self-Defense Forces law, a revision was  also m ade to the Defense Agency  
Establishment Law.  This revision allowed for the establishment of the Joint Staff Office 
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to facilitate the unified, joint operational structure necessary for missile defense.  Further 
joint task u nits consisting of elem ents of each branch of service are form ed as required 
under the command of the ASDF.66 New guidelines were established in 2007 authorizing 
the Defense Minister to give comm anders in the field the discretion to fire interceptors at 
incoming missiles in situations where there has been a clear sign of a missile attack.67 
Japan’s de cision to delegate th is autho rity ref lects b oth pragm atism and 
resignation.  It is p ragmatic in the s ense tha t a  missile defense initia tive that is  wholly  
reliant on a single decision -maker is alm ost invariably doom ed t o failure.  The 
resignation is found in  the accep tance th at high ideals of fer little defense again st an  
incoming missile.  Considered against the no rmalization trend lin e, this is f ar f rom 
“loosing the dogs of war,” but does represent a loosening of the reins that was not present 
a decade ago.   
Given that the author ity granted to the De fense Minis ter is  restricted to m issile 
defense, we can reasonably infer that missile defense necessitated a shift in policy.  Given 
that this reflects a relaxation of security policy it can further be inferred that the trend line 
has advanced as a result of missile defense. 
3. Partial Repeal of Weapons Export Ban 
As a testim ony to the degree to which m issile defense has challenged the status 
quo in Japanese defense policy, one need only consider its im pact on long-standing 
principles regarding weapons export.  The issue of arms sales has long been controversial 
in Japanese politics.  In 1967 the Sato Ca binet adopted a broad policy banning weapons 
exports to comm unist nations, nations subject to various U N resolutions, and nations 
involved in international conflict.  This wa s reinforced in 1976 when the Miki Cabinet 
called for restraint in wea pons exports to those nations  not covered under the 1967 
policy.  This position was softened som ewhat in 1983 when the Nakasone Cabinet 
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permitted the export of weapons technology to U.S., but reaffir med a l ong-standing ban 
on the export and joint production of weapons.68 
These policies remained unchanged for the next 20 years.  Ho wever, in 2004 the 
Koizumi Ca binet m ade substantial changes to  these long-standing policies.  The most 
notable exception is that the joint developm ent and production of missile defense system  
between Japan and the U.S. was deem ed permissible.  The change als o allowed for th e 
consideration of defense projects in suppo rt of counterterrori sm and anti-piracy 
operations.  The repeal of the ban on weapons  exports subsequently m ade it possible to 
proceed with the developm ent of a m issile defense initia tive.  Expressed differently , 
Japan’s commit ment to m issile defense was sufficient enough to revisit nearly four 
decades of standing policy on weapons export and development.69 
In this instance, the relationship between the policy change and missile defense is 
quite explicit, but what bears further extrapol ation is the degree to which this advances 
the security normalization trend.  While the primary objective was to advance the m issile 
defense initiative, there are two other facets that set conditions for the future expansion of 
the Japanese weapons industry.  The first is that the decision allows the governm ent to 
consider other defense projects , not necessarily associated with missile defense, with the  
U.S.  Further, the Japanese governm ent can also consider exports to other nations in 
support of counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations.  In principle, the types of weapons 
and the nations to which they can be exported to is quite broad.70 
The nature of modern weapons development entails a great deal of technical risk, 
which can quite often be quantified as a dollar amount.  Considered from this perspective, 
partnering with the U.S. reduces this risk a nd is quite pragmatic.  Moreover, the dual us e 
nature of  many techno logies a llows f or increa sed com petitive advantag e in the p rivate 
sector.  So while it could be  argued that the decision to modify long-standing policy on 
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arms exports could be attri buted to financial motives, m issile defense served as the 
galvanizing impetus to make such changes a reality. 
4. Use of Space for Military Purposes 
In 1969, th e Japanese Diet bann ed the use of space for m ilitary purposes.   
Considered in a lite ral and very strict sense,  this ban conceptually p recluded the us e of 
space based assets for such seemingly mundane functions as communications.  However,  
as with  m any facets  of Japanes e s ecurity, a lternative interpretati ons h ave allowed  for 
much wider spread use.   In this ins tance, th e Defense Agency has been authorized to 
employ space capab ilities th at are otherwis e commercially available.   This dual-use 
caveat has effectively allowed for th e use of vi rtually any space based capability that is 
not uniquely m ilitary.  Since the 1 980s, the Ja panese Defense Agency  has been able to  
make use of  a wide varie ty of  commercia l satellite app lications, to include 
communications and imagery. 71  This interpretation has also  served to set conditions for 
more expansive use of space-based  systems, which are inextricably related to Japanese 
missile defense. 
To place this in a m ore specific c ontext, in August of 1998 Nor th Korea 
conducted a test launch of a Taepodong m issile over Japan.  This event served as the 
impetus for Japan to begin the development of reconnaissance satellites and adopt a more 
expansive view of what constituted an acceptable use of space-based systems.  By March 
of 2003, Japan had launched two reconnaissance satellites.  W hile officially designated 
with the som ewhat vague title of  Inf ormation Gathering S atellites (IG S), this pro gram 
effectively enabled Japan to watch for similar North Korean launches.72 
At the tim e of the 1998 North Korean test , Japan’s sole indicator of the launch 
with advance notice provided by the U.S. Depa rtment of Defense.  The depths of this 
dependency proved to be very unsettling to th e Japanese Diet and the P rime Minister’s 
office.  W hile Japane se politic al en tities cla imed surprise a nd drew signif icant pub lic 
criticism, the Japanese Defense Agency had been the beneficiary of the U.S. advance 
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notice.  As evidence of this, a J apanese AEGIS destroyer was positioned near the flight 
path and collected substantial data on the launch.  The combined i mpacts of political 
embarrassment, a credible m issile threat, public support, and an obvious schism  between 
agencies provided the immediate impetus for the IGS system.   
By November of 1998, just three months after North Korea’s m issile test, Japan 
had committed to the development of a national capability to provide advance warning of 
launch indications.  W ithin the year, funds were appropriat ed for a system  designed to 
“collect im agery information neces sary to ensu re the nation al secur ity of  Japan.”  The 
IGS system would significan tly reduce Japan’s dependency on the U.S. to provide for 
advance warning and allow Japan to indigenously monitor for such threats. The collective 
system would consist of two optical sensor  satellites, two synt hetic aperture  radar 
satellites, and the necessary ground stations for satellite control, data collection, analysis, 
and dissemination.73  For the system to work as conceived, the Japanese government also 
established the Cabinet Satellite Intellig ence Center (CSIC), an organiza tion manned by 
320 person of which nearly one third are im agery analysts.  By th e end of 2003, all four  
satellites were in orbit.74 
While the previous paragraphs illustrate  a shift in Japan’s views on the use of 
space, recent legislation is even m ore explicit.  In July of 2 008, Japan passed th e Basic 
Space Bill,  which pro vides th e J SDF direct  contro l of the J apan’s reconnais sance 
satellites and increase the le vel state of technology em ployed by the satell ite programs.75 
Notably, Article 14 of t he bill requ ires the government to take "necessary m easures to 
promote space develop ment and use that would  promote both national and international 
security,” marking a clear depart ure from previous legislation. 76  More s pecifically, the 
JSDF can now “m anufacture, possess and op erate its own satell ites to support its 
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terrestrial m ilitary op erations, in cluding ba llistic m issile def ense ( BMD). Imm ediate 
candidates f or SDF procurem ent would be sa tellites for reconnaissa nce, early warning 
and tracking and communications - all to enhance BMD capabilities.”77 
One of the first steps for a success ful missile defense initiative is th e ability to  
effectively forecas t or d etect a laun ch even t.  In the case of Japan, the IGS program 
provides the m eans to observe for threats wh ile associated m issile def ense capab ilities 
would provide a means to effectively respond.  Although Japan has always benefited by a 
fairly liberal interpretation of security legislation, there are two elem ents of this prog ram 
that warrant distinction.  The  f irst is tha t the sy stem was conceived  and employed with 
the specific purpose of nati onal security.  This is a significant step beyond the long 
accepted p ractice of dual-use sp ace applicatio ns, and can readily be construed as  an 
advancement of the normalization trend.  The second is that IGS was developed in direct 
response to a perceived missile threat and in  the context of a broader m issile defense  
initiative.  Detection of  a launch event m ay facilitate some protective m easures, but is  
insufficient to eliminate the threat.  Used in concert with a missile defense capability, IGS 
becomes an integral component a much more comprehensive system. 
5. Pursuit of Offensive Capability 
The debate over whether a weapons system is of offensive or defensive is clouded 
between intent, perception, and cap ability.  As a resu lt, a conclusive an swer is not easily 
reached.  However, when planned Japanese procurements are placed in the context of the 
role they w ould play in  a m issile-defense scenario a clearer pictur e can be derived.  In 
this instan ce, the p latform in question is the planned Japanese acquisition of the F-22 
raptor from the U.S. 
The F-22 is arguably the world’s m ost advanced com bat aircraft.  It was  
developed primarily to defeat the Soviet advers ary in air to air com bat.  This is ach ieved 
through the utilization of st ealth technology, increased mane uverability, and avionics 
integrated with sensors into a sin gle displa y.  Because of the advanced nature of the 
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technology, the U.S. was som ewhat noncommittal in  regards to whether or not it sho uld 
be exported.  W ithin Japan one of the unresolve d issues is whether or  not the F -22 is in 
fact an offensive weapon.  In the U.S. it’s a far clearer issue, as the Departm ent of 
Defense justif ied the F- 22 on the b asis of its o ffensive capabilities.78  W hile this issue 
remains open to discussion, it is not unreasonable to characterize the F-22 as an offensive 
platform as that served as the basis for its original funding. 
The counter to this offensive characteri zation would be found in Japan’s planned 
use of  the aircr aft.  The intuitive ra tionale for purchasing a fighter aircraft with these 
capabilities is to f ill a critical gap in missile defense, specifically the ability to “penetrate 
enemy air defenses and strike m issiles before they can be launched.” 79 Expressed 
differently, Japan has  recently pursued the acqui sition of an airc raft defined by th e state 
which desig ned it as  of fensive with  the pr esumed purpose of striking m issiles prior to 
launch. 
The broad justification of missile defense makes it possible for Japan to justify the 
purchase of offensive aircraft.  It m akes it possible to conceive a preventive attack of an 
adversaries launch capability.  While these are eminently practical measures for a missile 
defense program, they a re also another advance on the security norm alization trend line.  
When placed in the context of a constitution that eschews war as a right of the state, these 
features of missile defense stand on the edge of aggressive posturing. 
6. Collective Security 
One aspect of m issile defense th at offe rs a direct challenge to the Japanese 
interpretation of their Constitu tion is the degree  to which it alm ost inextricably links the 
defense of Japan and the defense of the U. S.  This stem s from Ja pan’s long-held 
interpretation of Article 9 which asser ts that Japan is not allowed to participa te in 
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collective defense as such an initiative would go beyond the m inimal force necessary to  
defend the country.  T he following is an excerpt from  the Japa nese Diet’s 1981 
interpretation of the right of collective self-defense. 
 
It is self-evident that Japan has th e right of collectiv e self-defense under 
international law since it is a sove reign state, but that the ex ercise of the  
right of collectiv e self-defense is  no t permissible under the Constitu tion, 
since the exercise of the right of self-defense is authorized under Article 9 
of the Constitu tion is c onfined to the m inimum necessary  level for the 
defense of the country and the exerci se of the right of collective self -
defense exceeds the limit.80 
 
 This interpretation presents itself as a significant challenge to the m issile defense 
initiative.  Japan is currently not bound to support the U.S. in the event of confl ict, 
although the opposite does not hold true.  The issue that presents itself is that in the event  
of a m issile attack flying toward U.S. troops  operating outside of Japan or towards U.S. 
positions in the Pac ific, Japan canno t legally use its intercept capabilities to shoo t down 
said missile.  Further, th ere is some question as to whether or not  Japan would provide 
the U.S. with any tactic al inf ormation on such  a m issile a ttack.  W hile this cour se of 
action m ay exist within the legal constraints Japan is imposed upon itself, such a  
sequence of events would certainly do irrepa rable dam age to the secu rity relation ship 
with the U.S.81 
 This interpretation goes a bit beyond the hypothetical.  During Abe’s tenure as  
Prime Minister he established a review panel to consider the collectiv e defense is sue.  
One of the scenarios reviewed involved a North Korean m issile attack which was  
predicted to pass over Japan and strike Gua m or Honolulu.  The review panel determined 
that the existing government interpretation would not legally allow the shoot down of the  
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missile.  One of the m ore ironic aspects of this scenario is that Guam and Honolulu both 
have U.S. bases that contribute to the defense of Japan.82 
 This has proven to be a highly controve rsial issue in Japa n, where much of  the 
population is concerned that if  the country becom es fully e ngaged in collective defense  
the JSDF would become f ar more active ly engaged in U.S. m ilitary operations.  W hile 
previous Prim e Ministers Koizum i and Abe we re staunch supporters of revisiting the 
constitutional interpretation, current Prim e Minister Fukuda has adopted a m uch more  
conservative stance.  Further, recent polls have  indicated that a m ajority of the Japanese 
population support the current constitutional interpretation thereby adding a degree of 
political liability to any opposing actions.83 
 While the current Prime Minister has adopted a more centrist vi ew on the issue it 
is worth noting that Defense Minister Shiger u Ishiba has openly encouraged and open 
debate on collective defense.84  This is relevant in that reflects a new element in Japanese 
security dynam ics.  The Prim e Minister ca n adopt a very centrist view and thereby 
mitigate so me political risk, whereas th e Defense M inister can  adopt a s lightly more 
hawkish dem eanor and thereby advance secur ity concerns.  This reflects one of  the  
second order effects of the elevation of the Defense Agency to a Defense Ministry.  By 
virtue of  be ing im bued with m ore power, th e Def ense Ministry is be tter pos itioned to  
advance security concerns a bit more autonomously. 
  Whether or  not Japan  will a lter its in terpretation in the  near term rem ains 
uncertain.  Although the curren t adm inistration does not seem  inclined to press for 
constitutional change, it is faced with new challenges in the for m of U.S. pressure on the 
domestic defense industry.  The U.S. very clearly has a vested interest in Japan coming to 
its assistance in the case of missile attack and Japanese weapons manufacturers have a 
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very clear interest in ensuring that defense funds continue to flow.  What can be said with some 
certainty though is that the issue of missile de fense has pro mpted serious constitutional debate 
and while it has not y et yielded a constitutional re interpretation it remains at t he center of the 
issue. 
7. Preemptive Self-Defense 
There is another aspect of missil e defense has been alluded to in several of the preceding 
sections, specifically developing the capacity to prevent a missile attack by destroying it prior to  
launch.  Not surprisingl y, a new legal p recedent has emerged that would allow Japan to conduct 
such an attack should t here be an “i mminent and illegal invasion of Japanese territory.” In 2003, 
Japan passed the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in the 
Situation of Ar med Attack.  This law addresses various situations under which an attack might 
occur and defines one su ch situation as one wh ere “an armed attack against Japan fro m th e 
outside (including a case where an armed attack is imminent) has occurred or one where an armed 
attack i s anti cipated a s te nsions rise.”  This la w e ffectively encom passes both actual military 
attacks and the expectation of attacks.85 
From a t actical perspective, this is perf ectly logical.  However,  placed in the context of 
the peace constitution it appears to be far more aggressive.  Public comments made by then chief 
Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe offered at lease one i nterpretation of how a pree mption scenario 
may unfold: 
If we accept  that there is  no other option to prevent a m issile at tack,'' he told 
reporters, ''there is an argu ment that attacking the m issile bases wo uld be within  
the legal right of self-defense.  
Mr. Abe 's comments came a day  after the hea d of the De fense Agenc y, 
Fukushiro Nukaga, said Japan should consider pre-em ptive strikes ''if an enemy 
country definitely has a way  of att acking Japan and has its finger on the 
trigger.86  
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To be certain, the scenario was exam ined in a purely hypothetical light and the 
statements were quite probably intended to offer a deterrent in their ow n right.  The more 
relevant feature though, is the degree to which certain segments of elite political tho ught 
within Japan have m igrated away from  the presumed intent of the still popular peace 
constitution.  Viewed through this lens, P earl Harbor could be construed as existing 
within the bounds of contemporary Japanese law.   
Specific to this the sis, the two m ost rele vant features are the role of m issile 
defense and advancem ent of the norm alization trend line.  Regarding the form er, the 
discussion of preem ption is fram ed around pote ntial missile attacks and as such resides 
under the overarching umbrella of m issile defense.  This argument gains additional merit 
when considered in the context of Japan’s keen interest in, and presumed plans for, the F-
22.  Regar ding the latter, this clearly c onstitutes another step towards security 
normalization.  W hen high-rank ing Japanes e p ublic figu res accep t wh at can  only  be 
construed as preem ption than the threshold of first s trike has been b reached.  Th is is  
clearly not a position that would have been palpa ble when the Japanese Constitution  was 
adopted. 
8. From Agency to Ministry 
One recent action that dem onstrates a reci procal benefit in Japanese security  
advancements is the elevation of the Japane se Defense Agency (JDA) to the Japanese 
Ministry of Defense (MOD).  This advancem ent came about due in part to a perceived 
need for a more effective defense apparatu s fueled by  fears of North Korean m issiles. 
Considered as such, the need for a more eff ective defense against m issiles set conditions  
for elevating the agency.  Once elevated, th e MOD became better positioned to advocate 
security concerns. 
Executed in 2007, this elevation in status marked a considerable increase in the 
role of Japan’s defense organization.  During the Cold War, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) played a leading role in m atters of security policy.  In contrast, the JDA 
was relegated prim arily to the m anagement of the JSDF and coordinating basing issues.  
The nature of  their r espective duties illustrates the gap in r elative power.  W hereas the 
 66
MOFA served as a policy agency, the JDA was largely a management agency.  The post-
Cold War era introduced new challenges that co uld not readily be accommodated by this 
system.87 One of Japan’s adaptations to contem porary security considerations has been 
the elevation of the JDA. 
In 2006, then Prim e Minister Koizu mi introduced a bill to expand the prim ary 
duties of th e JSDF and  elevate the JDA to a m inistry.  Later that y ear, Koizu mi’s 
successor, Shinzo Abe, m ade the def ense bill one of  his top prioritie s and pushed the 
legislation through.  Prom inent features of th e revised laws are that they allow the MOD 
to convene cabinet m eetings and s ubmit bills to the Japanese Diet. 88  W hile there  is 
certainly a symbolic undertone to the  increase in status,  more practically it cedes a great 
deal m ore power to the long  suborned JDAA.  Further, while the bill calls for an 
“expansion of the primary duties” of the JSDF, it is far less explicit in fully characterizing 
said duties thus setting conditions for a fairly broad loophole should the need arise. 
 While the e levation of  the JDA is cons istent with the ob served trend  towards 
normalization, its relation to missile defense warrants further explanation.  There are two 
notable asp ects that illustrate the degree to which m issile defense has im pacted and  
benefited from the recent legislatio n.  Fore most is the “Jap anese public's growing desire 
for a sturdier national-defense system, especi ally amid North Korea's nuclear and missile 
activities.”89  The like lihood of  a def ense reform bill such as this pa ssing absent som e 
type of compelling threat is substantially reduced.  The public’s desire for security, borne 
of fears of North Korean missile attacks, reduced the political liability of what at one time 
would have appeared to be overly hawkish behavior.   
The second, less direct correlation is found in th e im pacts on the budgeting 
process.  By allowing the Defense Ministry to submit its own budget to the Diet rather 
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than subm it via the Prim e Minister, the defense budget is delinked fro m the political 
mainstream.  Condition s are se t to advocate for defense spe nding with f ar less po litical 
liability.  D espite recent dec lines in defense spending, the cum ulative costs of m issile 
defense, standard procurem ent of weapons  system s, Japan’s increased role in UN 
missions, and the long-suffering Japanese eco nomy, it can be expected that m inistry 
endorsed budget increases will be forthcoming. 
9. Permanence 
Several actions had to take place to m ake m issile defense a viable Japanese 
security option.  However, ac tions that are taken can of ten be readily undone.  What 
confers a degree of perm anence on the actions  taken to  facilitate missile defense is the 
degree to w hich they are now entrenched in J apanese law .  Precedin g sections have 
referenced changes to various Japanese po licies and laws precip itated by a desir e f or 
missile defense capability.  Considered indivi dually, these appear to  be  a sim ple le gal 
necessity required to support a given initiative.  However, when the changes to law and 
policy are considered collectively the depth of  the structural chang e associated  with 
missile defense becom es far m ore apparent.  The f ollowing is a syno psis of  laws and  
policy changes enacted under the broader rubric of missile defense. 
 
 (2003) Measures to Ensure Na tional Independence and Security : In 2003, the Japanese 
parliament the Japanese parliam ent passed a law concerning measures to ensure na tional 
independence and security in a situation of armed attack.  The following is an ex cerpt 
from Article 76 of the law: 
When there is an armed attack to our nation from the outside our windows 
considered that there is an infinite and clear danger of an armed attack the 
prime minister, and he or she considers it necessary from the standpoint of 
defending the nation, he or she m ay orde r the whole or part of the self-
defense forces in operation.90 
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 What prompts concern  about this law is the ill-defined n ature of “imminent.”    
While this is generally construed as meaning some type of preventive action in the event 
of detected missile launch activity, it is not restrict ed to this interpretation.  The tren d in 
the growth of the JSDF has been one of liberal  interpretation when  convenient, and 
restrictive when not.  Considere d in this context, it is not unreasonable that this 
stipulation may prompt regional concern. 
 
(2004) Repeal of W eapons Export Ban : On Decem ber 10, 2004 the Japanese Cabinet  
approved revisions to the National Defense Program  outline loos ening arm s export 
restrictions.  This change has generated a wide variety of options in terms of international 
weapons developm ent, production, and expor tation.  W hile it is  focused on m issile 
defense, this is  not a s trict limitation.  Th is rep resents the most signif icant po licy shif t 
regarding Japanese arms exports since 1983.91 
Beyond missile defense, the m odification has also m ade it possible to consider a 
litany of products desig ned for use against te rrorist attacks.  Hel mets, body arm or, and 
other form s of personal protective equipm ent are all viable candi dates for government 
approval.  While a case-by-case ex amination will take place for any pr oposed export the 
overall criterion remains vague.  In addition to missile defense, Japan is also engaged in 
joint development with U.S. electronic equipment for patrol aircraft.92 
The aforementioned rep resent the o verall in tent of the m odification.  However, 
the degree of a mbiguity in term s of what c onstitutes an acceptable item  sets conditions 
for considerable controversy. To that end, seve ral countries in the region have expressed 
interest in buying used naval assets from  the Maritim e Self-Defense Force or the 
Japanese Coast Guard.  The intended use of th ese assets would be to prevent terrorist 
action and piracy in the Straits of Malacca.  The challenge of exports such as these is that 
from the mom ent the weapon is sold, Japa n loses positive control and has relatively 
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limited m eans to  ensur e that th e ex ported arm s do not fall into the hands of less than 
reputable states.  While some legal assurances can be provided, this is  a perpetual risk in 
entering the arms market.93 
 
(2006) Self Defense Law 82-2 : In 2006, a significant m ilestone was made in regards to 
the delegation of authority to military commanders.  Notably, the air defense command or 
would be granted the authority to order the laun ch of interceptors in the  event of  missile 
attack.  This m easure was undertaken to fi nalize an effective comm and structure to 
support the missile defense system.  The Air Defense Commander will also be appointed 
to the commander of missile defense task forces.  In th is capacity, he  will receive direct 
support from Japanese naval assets.  In the event that the commander is not available, 
launch authority is def erred to  the commanders of Japan’s Ae gis destroyers.  This is 
notable in that reflects  a sign ificant degree of delegation pr eviously unseen in Japanese  
forces.94 
(2007) Defense Agency Establishment Law: In December 2007, Japan’s Defense Agency 
was formerly re-des ignated as a Def ense Ministry.  As a result, m ilitary of ficials put a  
much m ore significant role in  Jap anese stra tegic planning.  Prior to this  chang e, th e 
Defense Agency was subordinated under the Cabinet office.  The security threat 
presented by North Korea over the past decade ha s steadily g iven rise to in creased 
Japanese concerns about defense.  Concer ns about security st eadily elevated the  
prominence of Japanese defense offi cials in terms of engaging with the U.S. Department 
of Defense and negotiating viab le s ecurity a rrangements.  As an outcome of its newly 
elevated po sition, Japan’s Defense Ministry  will be m uch m ore heavily involv ed in  
policy planning and defense budgeting than pr evious eras.  The failure of previous 
attempts to upgrade the Defense Agency has been attribu ted to resid ual anti-m ilitary 
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sentiment among the Japanese public.  This sentiment shifted with North Korea’s 2006 
test launches.  As a result over 90% of the lawmakers in the Diet backed the promotion of 
the former Defense Agency.95 
 
(2008) Basic Space Bill : In 2008 Japanese parliam ent m ade substantial changes to 
acceptable uses of space established in 1969.   The Basic Space Bill elim inated the long-
standing principle of the nonmilitary uses of sp ace and s et conditions for the further us e 
of space-based defensive systems, to include s py satellites.  The most notable shift is the 
change from nonm ilitary to nonaggression wh ich gives th e governm ent m uch broader 
leeway in the employment of space-based systems.96  
 
To be sure, with effort and tim e laws can be changed.  However, in the case of  
Japanese security change has cons istently manifested itself as an inc rease in th e relative 
prominence, capabilities, and latitude of the JSDF.  Expressed differently, the direction of 
security legislation has clearly tren ded towards a higher degree of freedom  in Japanese 
security actions.  Even prior to the advent of missile defense Japa n’s security app aratus 
experience substantial growth.  With a m issile defense there has been an added i mpetus 
to overcome a multitude of restrictive laws and policy.  Given that the post-World War II 
trend has c onsistently moved towards a nor malized Japanese m ilitary and tha t Japan 
invested a legislative tim e and effort to enact sweeping changes and defense policy and 
law is reasonable to conclude that these changes will remain in effect. 
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C. CONCLUSIONS 
Missile defense is far m ore than “point  and shoot.” To m ake it work, Japan has 
had to undertake several signif icant changes to its defense establishment.  Collectively, 
these chang es have len t them selves to a burgeoning m issile defe nse capability, but 
perhaps m ore im portantly th ey ha ve signif icantly advan ced Japan’ s position  on  the 
security normalization trend line.  These ch anges have encompassed the elevation of  the 
Japanese Defense Agency to a full m inistry, a technical o rientation intended to heighten 
the degree of coordination betw een the respective services, th e repeal of weapons export  
bans, the launching of satellites, the acqui sition of less ambiguous offensive hardware, 
the delegation of  comm and authority, and a  re-v isitation of  m ultilateral se curity 
cooperation.   
Perhaps m ost signif icantly, the majority of the changes to Japanese defense  
posture have been accompanied by law.  While it is possible that so me or all of these 
laws can be  changed, this is a time intens ive, laborious, and uncertain process.  This  
would imply that these changes are of an e nduring nature.  Based on the observations in 
the preceding chapter,  the Japanese governm ent has becom e quite adept at making  
defense modifications strictly through reinterpretation.  Given that the effort was m ade to 
capture this latest round of changes in law it can  be inferred that they were intended to be 
permanent.  Further, each of these changes ei ther resides under the missile defense rubric 
or is directly related to it. 
The Japanes e peace  con stitution asp ires to the highest idea ls and still reta ins a  
high degree of public support.  Further, th e residual anim osity in the region stem ming 
from Japan’s wartime atrocities still lingers.  As a result, Jap anese security issues foment 
a high degree of domestic debate an d regional concern.  This chapter ha s illustrated that 
the pursuit of m issile defense has significantl y advanced Japan’s security norm alization 
posture.  This observation and these conclu sions are als o easil y reached by Japan’s 
neighbors.  As a state, Japan ha s every right to arm  itself, but to maintain such a capable 
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IV. PERCEPTIONS AND OBSTACLES  
A. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE TREND 
The preceding chapters  have identified what would seemingly appear to be 
unstoppable trend towards norm alization.  This  is by no m eans a certainty.  Any a ction 
taken to improve Japan’s security posture i nvariably car ries with it bo th inte rnal and  
external criticism .  Internally, resou rces co mmitted to defense com e at the expense of 
other prog rams.  Exter nally, any s hift in def ense postur e alte rs the m ilitary options 
available to other states.  Resistance to change  of this type may eventually manifest itself 
as political action tak en either in su pport of or in opposition  to a planned action.  As the  
outcomes of these political actions  speak di rectly to  the success of  a given se curity 
measure, any political action thu s warrant s careful con sideration.  Adding to the  
complexity is tha t is sues are nev er truly reso lved.  In th is sense, any g iven military or  
political action sets co nditions for the nex t round of m ilitary and  political m oves.  
Moreover, actions taken on one front have the potential to impact on another.   
As a case in point, Chinese opposition to Japanese m issile defense may manifest 
itself in various types of econom ic sanctions and thereby reduce the degree of econom ic 
interdependence.  Reduction of missile defense may tend to limit the degree of Japanese-
U.S. military interaction and weaken the security alliance.  A  weakened security alliance 
and a lack of missile defense may serve to embolden North Korea.  Succinctly, no action  
can be taken in isolation.  While this hypothetical exam ple has focused on external 
concerns, the sam e set of cons iderations is pre sent when ex amining internal p ressures.  
This chapte r will exam ine sever al of  the f actors that m ay serve to impede continued 
progress toward full security normalization. 
1. The Regional Repercussions of U.S. Entanglement 
In examining any Japanese alliance with the U.S., the issues surrounding China 
and Taiwan must also be considered.  As a key component of U.S. and Japanese security 
cooperation is m issile defense, another exacerb ating factor is put into play.  Although it 
would seem that Japanese m issile defense would be viewed as benign in that it does not 
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present an  o ffensive threat, it is  not the case in the v iew o f other regional actors.  So, 
while Japan’s alliance with the U.S. offers some reassurance from attack, it also entwines 
Japan in a set of broader regional concerns.97 
 Two of the factors that shape China’s vi ew of security are aggress ive J apanese 
actions prior to and during W orld War II and the “Taiwan issue.” Regarding the for mer, 
there rem ains an enduring concern about how a re-m ilitarized Japan m ay behave.  
Regarding the latter, C hina views Taiwan as  its sovereign territory and takes strong 
objection to any overtures towards independenc e and any parties that otherwise support 
it.98  The nature of these issues shapes  a set of Chinese views that, not surprisingly, are 
concerned with Japan’s security apparatus and alliances.   
Expressed differently, U.S. relations with Taiwan lim it China’s freedom of action 
regarding how it behaves towards Taiwan.  U.S. relations with Japan have a similar effect 
which is further exacerbated in the e vent that Japan is able to m aintain an active missile 
defense.  This would serve as a significant counter to one of Chin a’s primary deterrent 
measures, specifically missile forces.  The nature of a security alliance of this type brings 
to the forefront China’s concerns rega rding potential for support for Taiwan’s 
independence and Japan’s autonomy within the region.99 
 Accepting China’s con cerns over Taiwan  and Japan’s history of aggression, a  
framework has been established to more broa dly consider the political consequence of 
Japan’s sec urity allianc e with th e U.S.  In  the  event of  signif icant c ross strait te nsion 
between China and Taiwan the U.S. would almo st certainly request Jap anese assistance 
in establishing missile defense.  W ere Japan to decline this request, it would invar iably 
have a negative im pact on the existing security  alliance.  In contrast however, if Japan 
were to support the U.S. request and position its forces to  actively defend Taiwa n it 
would be construed by China as a Japanese ac t of aggression in regards to a sovereign 
territorial matter and risk escalation.100 
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 Viewed through this lens, while there are undoubtedly benefits to m aintaining a 
security alliance with the U.S., there are also significan t risk s.  One of the mos t 
contentious friction points in the region, Taiwan, has the potential to draw in Japan given 
that m issile defense co nstitutes a key com ponent of security cooperation between  the 
U.S. and Japan.  Any Japanese action taken in  support of Taiwan, defensive or otherwise, 
taps a degree of historical animosity that has never truly subsided.  While it is reasonable 
to ass ert tha t acc ess to U.S. m ilitary capabili ties is to J apan’s benef it, it is a lso w orth 
noting that an alliance with the U. S. has th e potential to height en the likelihood of 
conflict. 
The high priority Japan  places on m issile defense is pred icated on the potential 
missile threat present in North Kore a and Chin a.  Initiatives of this type have produced 
strong responses from  other regional actors.   N otwithstanding lingering anim osity over 
past Japanese aggression, other reasons have em erged for actively opposing Japanese 
missile defense.  Notably, China has voiced  strong opposition based on the possibility 
that the m issile defense initiative would extend  to encom pass Taiwan and that it w ould 
serve to undermine China’s deterrence capability.101 
China’s con cerns carry  with them  a basi s of validity.  Man y Chinese o fficials 
reject the Japanese position that its m issile defense is focused towards North Korea, as 
they view the North Korean threat as  being highly exaggerated.  In contrast, China tends  
to view Japanese missile defense as having the potential to protect Taiwan in the event of 
a direct military confrontation.  If missile de fense were to be extended to  Taiwan, Japan 
would ef fectively nu llify one of  the prim ary deterrence measures ava ilable to China to 
preclude Taiwanese declarations of  independe nce.  China also has a s et of secon dary 
concerns in that the transf er of theater m issile defens e technology to Taiwan m ay set 
conditions to integra te it into U.S. led command and control sys tems.  This would 
constitute an independent and de f acto military alliance of  sorts, which is prec isely the 
kind of behavior China seeks to preclude from Taiwan.102 
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 The extension of m issile defense to include Taiwan is not China’s only concern.  
China also worries that the m odernization of its m issile forces would be rendered 
obsolete in the face of an effective Japanese missile defense.  While this may imply that 
Japan is being targeted by China, this is a highly plau sible scenario.  In th e event o f 
Chinese-American conflict, Japan would alm ost certainly com e under  attack.  As the 
Taiwan Relations Act implies U.S. support to Taiwan in the face of Chi nese aggression, 
and as Japan hosts significant numbers of U.S. forces on its territory, it is not im probable 
to consider a scenario in which Japan would face a m issile attack f rom China due to its 
military ties with the U.S., regardless of any offensive actions.103  
 Missile defense for Japan does not necessarily equate to strictly Japanese security.  
If extended to cover Taiwan, it serves to strengthen Japan’s position as a regional military 
actor while also undermining wh at China views to be its s overeign territory.  Further, 
while it is in part the U.S. security alliance that enables a m issile defense, it is the  U.S. 
presence in  Japan  that increases its target  potential in the ev ent of Sino-Am erican 
conflict.  Collectively, Japane se missile defense touches u pon domestic political issues 
within China, domestic political issues within Taiwan, reg ional security issues between 
Japan and China, the security alliance be tween the U.S. and Japan, and Japanese 
domestic politics regarding the presence of U.S. forces. 
One of the more vehem ent detractors of Japan’s m issile def ense initiativ es is  
China.  The essence of their concern stem s from the possibility th at, if  successf ul, the 
defensive shield could be extended to cover Taiwan.  As China’s missile forces constitute 
a critical co mponent of their military and could  conceivably play a sig nificant role in a  
forcible s eizure of  Taiwan, a capa bility of  this type has the potential to lim it po licy 
options.104 This position is, of course, predic ated on a suc cessful m issile defense 
capability, and given the sheer num bers of Chinese missiles, some doubt its efficacy and 
thus refute China on this point.  As m ight be  expected th en, this is n ot China’s sole  
objection. 
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 In a similar vein, China has estab lished its objections on the fu rther basis that its  
own deterrence capability m ight be underm ined, concerns over the threat of Japanese 
remilitarization, further streng thening of the U.S. - Japan alliance, an d the poten tially 
negative im pact it would have on the global arm s control process. 105 Underm ining 
deterrence is not dissim ilar from  the obj ections surrounding Taiwan, except with a  
broader, regional consideration.  The other th ree, however, carry with them som e degree 
of further validity. 
 In order to achieve the desired  missile defense capabilities,  Japan has had to re-
organize k ey aspects  of its m ilitary to res pond m ore quickly and in tegrate with U.S. 
command and control system s.  Further, Japan has had to acquire a ssets that, despite a  
purported defensive role, also carry with them an offensive potential. 106  Collectiv ely, 
these actions suggest that Japan is taking a step towards re-militarization and is becoming 
more aligned with the U.S. in the  military domain.  While not speak ing to inten t, on the 
surface this would seem to support China’s interpretation of events.  
 As to China’s final objection, that m issile defense would have a negative im pact 
on the global arm s control process, som e e xploration of the logi c is warranted.   The 
potential le thality of a  single  warh ead is su ch tha t in ord er to be successful m issile 
defense has to have a consistently high s hoot-down rate.  Absent this, even a sm all 
percentage of total m issiles launched can have  disastrous consequences.  Therefore, it 
becomes beneficial to create more missiles as a means to defeat a missile defense system.  
While cer tain logic  is  p resent in this argum ent, it seem s to speak m ore to China  itself  
rather than global arms control. 
 Given the regional focus of Japan’s effort, the o nly regional actor with sufficient 
resources to pursue this course of action is Ch ina.  This has been consid ered external to  
China where it has been suggested that m issile defense will antagonize China, “whose 
relatively few nuclear m issiles would be rend ered impotent were an anti-m issile shield  
ever to work. The m ere threat of deploym ent would therefo re encourage China to build 
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more missiles, setting off an arms race in As ia, and this will play in to the hands of those 
within Beijing's leadership that are looking for 'an American enemy' to solidify their own 
domestic political positions on the basis of uncompromising nationalism.”107 
 This ultimately leads to a single po int: China does not approve of Japan’s missile 
defense efforts.  This invites the question of  what actions, if any, wil l China take to 
impede Japans ef forts.  At this point, the  answer seem s to be very  little.   Othe r than  
expressing their concerns, China and Japan continue their econom ic engagem ent and 
while China’s military modernization efforts remain underway, they have been underway 
for quite so me time.  Over th e longer term, as m issile defense capabilities mature, this  
may become m ore of a concern.  F or the in terim, it seem s to be a recu rring catalyst for 
arms control debates and a reasonable Japa nese ra tionale f or ta king a m ore cautious 
approach towards continued normalization activities. 
 These concerns may serve to slow the tr end, but certainly no m ore than Japanese 
domestic politics.  W hile interna tional c oncerns m ay infor m the decision on security 
normalization, it is ultim ately grounded in what is politically viable  to the Japanese 
polity.  Fur ther, giv en the volum e of  m issiles possessed  b y China an d the aggre ssive 
tendencies of North Korea, Japan has adopt ed a very pragm atic approach tow ards 
defending itself should the need arise.  Given the nature of this potential threat, m issile 
defense is the required counter.  The only state with the technol ogy and resources to 
assist in this developm ent is the U.S.  Alt hough there are som e associated risks in such 
alignment, these inv ariably have to  be weighed against the aforem entioned regional 
factors.  Expressed differently, the risks associated with two neighbors each possessing a 
credible missile forces have to be weighed against those of taking no defensive action and 
basing national security on the generosity of others.  In this instance, missile defense was 
determined to be preferable and the security trend line was advanced. 
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2. Internal Political Economy 
Not all con siderations r egarding se curity a re e xternal.  In a post-W orld W ar II 
environment, the concept of militarization quickly evolved into a highly politicized issue 
within Japan.  Following W orld War II, Ja pan adopted the Yoshida Doctrine which 
served as the basis for much of Japan’s subs equent foreign-policy.  This approach relies 
primarily on the U.S. for defense and focu sed on rapid econom ic growth in order to 
reintegrate J apan into th e internatio nal community.  Over the next five  decades, J apan 
steadily became portrayed as a “free rider”, as it  bore little of  its secu rity costs.  Du ring 
the first Gulf War this cam e to a head as Japan provided financial support rather than 
troops.  This type of checkbook diplom acy dr ew significant criticism  and prom pted a 
significant reevaluation of the Japanese approach toward security. 
The first Gulf War had a signif icant impact on the politics o f Japan.  This event 
brought to light question s of constitu tional interpretation, approaches to J apanese – U.S. 
relations, and the need to better define the pos ition of the self-defense forces.  The most 
significant, however, were the deb ates reg arding the Constitu tion?  Changes to the  
constitution invariably s peak to  the basic principles of politi cal structure, which in turn 
has the  potentia l to  in troduce sweeping chan ge into  a s tate.  W hile this issue was 
prominent during the 1950s, for the nex t five decades econom ic developm ent and 
sustained economic growth tended to  dominate the political agenda.  108   Following the 
end of the Cold W ar and the em ergence of new conf lict in the Mi ddle East questions 
were again asked. 
For those opposing the fundamental principles of the existing system the basis for 
dissent stems from the means by which the Ja panese constitution was adopted.  W hile it 
is com prised prim arily of the standard feat ures of Western de mocracy, it contains two 
very unique provisions.  The first is the sym bolic role of the em peror and the second is a 
renunciation of war.  Al though this was notiona lly a rev ision of the Meiji Constitu tion 
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and with th e broad sup port of the Japanese p eople, oppo sition parties hold that the 
constitution was in f act f orced upon Japan by the Allied p owers and thus questio n its  
legality.109  
The conservative pow ers that originally pursued this agenda  did so without 
coming to term s with a consequenc e of prewar m ilitarism.  As they pur sued revision to 
Article 9, which renounces the use of force, they also sought to transform the e mperor 
from a f igurehead to a sovereign ru ler.  As Article 1 of  the Constitution  asserts th at the 
position of the em peror is derived from  the will of the people, this type of sweeping 
change ran directly counter to the basic pr inciple of the system , specifically pop ular 
sovereignty. 110 In this regard the issue of Japanese rearmament became closely linked to 
the larger principles of the political system. 
Throughout the 1950s, f ears of being em broiled in U.S. - S oviet armed conflict 
resulted in a strong peace m ovement which staunchly advocated ne utrality. Further, by 
the time of the San Francisco Peace Treaty  in 1960, the Japanese peace m ovement had 
sufficiently broad appeal to force the wit hdrawal of the Kishi government.  Kishi’s 
successor, Ikeda Hayato, was a bit m ore attuned to the times.  He tended to steer awa y 
from larger constitutional issues and focus on rapid econo mic growth.  Ikeda lim ited the 
constitutional controversy by si mply asserting that it was acceptable for Japan to possess 
a m inimal force neces sary for defense.  Moreover, by allowing the  U.S. to burden  
security costs, Japan was free to focus its national income on economic development.111  
As the Japanese economy grew, the U.S.  began to m ore closely consider the 
expansion of Japan’s organic defenses.  To counter this, Japan would occasionally invoke 
Article 9 as a political to ol to minimize defense spending.  This resulted in a m ainstream 
policy “of light arm aments plus rapid econom ic development.” This continued until the 
oil crises of the 1970s prom pted the U.S. to consider its own securi ty strategy.  T o this 
end, the U.S. effectively increased the pressu re on Japan to increase its share of the 
defense burden.  Under the Nakasone governm ent in the 1980s, defense spending 
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increased significantly, implying that Japan had turned a corner in which the preservation 
of good relations with the U.S. were m ore i mportant than a strict interpretation of  the 
Japanese Constitution.112 Of note, the actions taken during this era were done within the 
bounds of the cons titution and effectively de-li nked from the m ore contentious issue of 
the overall political structure. 
Japanese defense spending continued to increase throughout the 1980s, eventually 
reaching a point where  its m ilitary expenditu res were  th ird larges t in the world.  
Constitutionality was p reserved by charac terizing all f orces as pu rely def ensive.  So 
while Japanese forces were significantly increased, the debate s surrounding the self-
defense forces and the constitution remained generally untouched.  A re -visitation of the 
issue was forced by the end of the Cold W ar and the beginning of the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War.113 
 The end of the Cold War dram atically altered the underpinnings of U.S. - 
Japanese security.  Further, the outbreak of the Gulf War clearly illustrated that reg ional 
disputes were far from over.  The constitu tion was ill-suited to address what actions 
Japan should take to contribu te to the preservation of in ternational society given the 
presence of an aggresso r.  The governm ent chose to stress the universal ideals im plicit 
within Article 9, specifically  “an in ternational peace base d on jus tice and order” and 
sought to deploy self Defense forces abroad. 114  In this regard, th e Japanese government 
found its ju stification within th e language of  the cons titution rather than dram atically 
altering it. 
 In practice, this in terpretation drew harsh criticism  from Japanese oppo sition as  
they viewed deploym ent of forces as unconstitu tional.  Fur ther, the legislation allowing 
for the deploym ent of forces was introdu ced at a point in tim e where the opposition 
comprised the majority in the upper house, si gnificantly reducing the possibility that the 
bill would be passed without significant com promise.  As the Japanese political drama  
unfolded, the Gulf W ar began and quickly ended.  The swift c onclusion of the war  
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ameliorated much of the discussion regarding th e use of self defense assets in the region.  
Following the close of hostilities, Japan was able to deploy m inesweepers to the M iddle 
East on the basis that minesweeping  was a peaceful activity. 115  In this regard, there w as 
some modest expansion of the role of Japanese  forces, but largely after the fact and in a 
much less controversial role. 
In contrast, following the events of 11 September 2001, Japan quickly employed 
non-combat forces in support of opera tions in both Afghanistan and Iraq. 116 One of the 
primary drivers behind this change was Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro.  From 2001 to 
2006 he significantly altered Ja panese foreign policy and displayed a significantly less 
recalcitrant attitude regarding the ev ents of World War II than did his p redecessors.  In  
addition to the disp atching of  troo ps abro ad, during his tenure, th e U.S. and Japan 
completed a def ense policy rev iew initiative to  strengthen the bila teral allianc e, Ja pan 
assumed a more assertive role in regards to North Korean missile testing and abduction of 
Japanese citizens, and much to the chagri n of neighboring countri es Koizum i made a 
highly publicized visit to the Yasukuni Sh rine comme morating Japanese war dead. 117 
These unprecedented  actions rep resent a si gnificant d omestic transfor mation in  
addressing security issues through the Japanese political system. 
 Prior to Koizum i becoming prim e minister, the p osition had signif icantly limited 
power.118 The long dominant Liberal Democratic Party was characterized by a significant 
number of factions.  Thus, any potential prime minister had to develop coalitions in order 
to come to power.  In order to achieve this , many political concessions had to be made 
which diluted the power one m ight expect to fi nd in the office of the prim e minister.  In 
addition to concession s of  this typ e, the Jap anese political apparatus also m aintains the  
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zoku, which serves as a  filtering mechanism prior to po licy reaching the cabinet.119  In 
this regard, the zoku wields significant power  in that they can m odulate what policies are  
presented. 
 Given this set of circum stance, it is difficult to envision a singular leader  
achieving th e rela tive pr ominence th at Koizum i enjoyed.  H owever, prior to Koizu mi 
coming to power, electoral reform  dissipated some of the factional power.  Further, m ass 
media became more prominent in crafting a personal image allowing for individuals to 
achieve greater popularity a mong voters.  Koiz umi would deftly m anage these resources 
to his advantage.  His position was significan tly strengthened as an outcom e of postal 
reform initiatives,  which collectively encompassed not only m ail, but also banking and 
insurance.  As his reform s were stalled by  the zoku, Koizumi capitalized on the  use of  
media, public support for the issue and swift political action to effectively oust opposition 
and centralize the party.   In doing so, the power of the zoku was diminished and the party 
gained significant unity. 120  This combination and  sequence of  political action not on ly 
cemented Koizum i’s dom estic popularity, bu t also set conditions for m uch greater 
political autonomy. 
 In the context of security, these political actions have significant ramifications.  In 
order for substantive change to be made in security policy, some mechanism for breaking 
through the political gridlock has to occur.  The actions of Koizumi did precisely this and 
set conditions for subsequent security changes.  Koizum i’s penchant f or swif t and bold 
policy making based on the support of both th e public and the party enabled a range of  
options that his successors sim ply did not  enjoy.  The actions taken during his tenure 
clearly reflect a distinct transformation in Japanese foreign-policy. 
Immediately following the events of 11 Se ptember, the Japanese Diet passed an 
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law which dispatched self-defense forces to the Indian 
Ocean in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan.  The speed with which th is law 
was enacted  is unp recedented in recent Japan ese history.   W hereas previous  security  
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legislation required m onths of deliberation, this law was passe d within four weeks.  On 
the basis of this law, Japan would proceed to  dispatch forces in supp ort of non-com bat 
operations in Iraq.121 
Koizumi’s actions did not stop there.  He  made two visits to North Korea in order 
to seek resolution on the issu e of abduction of  Japanese ci tizens and contribute to the  
resolution of the North Korean nuclear arm ament.  Further, he was actively engaged in 
the realignment of U.S. bases in Japan, fostered political debate regarding Article 9 of the 
Japanese constitution, and committed Japan to the pursuit o f ballistic missile defense. 122  
The introduction of the latter broug ht about significant changes in the com position and 
capability of the Japanese Self Defense Force. 
In order to achieve the technically ch allenging objective of  m issile defense, 
significant military capabilities would be requ ired.  Given the com plexity of the system, 
an extensiv e command-and-con trol apparatu s would need to be developed.  This 
prompted a need for a r estructuring and in creased emphasis on joint capabilitie s within 
Japan’s Self Defense Force.  The nature of  these changes also included the introduction 
of legislatio n to m ore specif ically addres s civ ilian contro l over the m ilitary.  T hese 
changes were significan t in that for the fi rst tim e since W orld W ar II, both the Prime 
Minister an d m ilitary c ommanders have been af forded the latitude to  m ake real- time 
military decisions without the oversight of the cabinet and the Diet.123 
Taken collectively, it is  dif ficult to  envision such a substantial shift in Japanese 
security policy absent the actions of Prime Minister Koizumi.  Notwithstanding historical 
animosity and the constitutional issues surrounding the Japanese use of force, his political 
acumen and judgm ent enabled him  to m aneuver through significant impedim ents and 
facilitate change on a scale not of ten seen in Ja panese politics, par ticularly in matters of 
national security.  While this is an impressive political feat, it should be noted th at these 
actions did not garner unanimous support and continue to face opposition from numerous 
fronts. 
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 While there are num erous obstacles  to cu rrent Japanese  se curity in itiatives, the  
domestic challenges tend to center on the issu es of defense  spending, legal barriers, and 
public acceptance.  The issue of defense spe nding is a challenge faced by all s tates.  As 
Japan limits defense spending at 1% of its gross domestic product, a significant portion 
will invariably be tied to m issile defense.  Th is in turn lim its the am ount of money that 
can be com mitted to other def ense initiatives,  specifically the expans ion of the SDF on 
other fronts.  Additional financ ial considerations come into play as Jap an has agr eed to 
provide approximately $6 billion to facilitate the transfer of U.S. forces from Okinawa to 
Guam.124  Given these defense commit ments and financial lim itations, Japan has 
assumed a path characterized by high technical risk along a single threat axis, specifically 
missile defense.  The investm ent in m issile defense precludes its capacity for  
developments on o ther f ronts.  The  intu itive means of  add ressing a b roader range  of  
operations invariably entail additional defe nse spending, which com es at the expense of 
other government initiatives. 
 The legal fram ework for defense actions  is also under constant scrutiny.  As  
recently as 2005, the Japanese governm ent interp reted that “the use of arm ed force is 
permissible as a m eans to exercise the ri ght of self-defense under Article 9 of the 
Constitution only when there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against 
Japan; there is no appropriate m eans to deal with such an act of aggression other than by 
resorting to the right of self defense; and the use of arm ed strength is  c onfined to the 
minimum necessary level.” 125 This  inte rpretation sign ificantly lim its Jap anese 
participation in any capacity and in som e instances creates an addition al burden f or the 
forces of other states.   As a case in point, Japanese forces engage d in reconstruction 
efforts in Iraq had to be provided security by  Australian f orces.  This set of conditions 
limits the conditions in which Japanese forces m ay be e mployed to such a degree that 
their participation may not be welcome.126 
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 Also lack ing in regard  to s ecurity is  clea r p ublic conse nsus.  W hile a s lim 
majority favor constitutional revision, of t hose that do 70% hold that the con stitution 
should clarify the existence of  the SDF.  Nearly half of  the respondents hold that the 
constitution cannot adequately address new issues, 27% view that more explicit language 
is required to address collec tive s elf-defense, 23% hold that the existing language is  
sufficient, and 44% are of the opinion that government policy towards collective defense 
should not change. 127  These som ewhat ambiguous results tend to reflect a very diverse 
set of public opinions.  While constitutional revision could clarify both the mission of the 
SDF and Japanese security policy, dram atic changes to Japan’s p acifist trad ition also  
introduces the risk of public outcry and da mage regional perceptions of Japan, both of 
which constitute political risk. 
 Japanese se curity, to include m issile def ense, is a politically cha rged arena.  
While polling data in dicates a d esire for security, pop ular suppo rt for the p eace 
constitution tends to s tall aggr essive advances in security measures.  Further, the m ost 
recent Prim e Min ister did not pu rsue as ag gressive of a security  agenda as  his  
predecessors.  Absent this top level advocacy, itself a partial reflection of public opin ion, 
it is not like ly that th e next decade will s ee the degree of norm alization progress made  
during Koizumi’s tenure.  However, while the trend may slow, it is not likely tha t it will 
reverse.  The pursuit of  m issile def ense sp eaks directly to public concerns over N orth 
Korea, and therefore presents little political liability increasing the potential for program 
success.  As long as this initiative continue s, the attendant featur es identified in the 
previous ch apter will rem ain in place as  a matter of necessity.   Sub sequent system ic 
shocks, such as a dynam ic political leader with  an aggres sive defense agenda, sustained 
aggressive behavior by North Korea, or focused pursuit of a perm anent seat on the UN 
Security Council, would each have the potential to advance the trend line further. 
                                                 
127 Nicholas Szechenyi, “A Turning Point for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces,” The Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2006): 145-146. 
 87
3. Technical Risk 
The discussion thus far has centered on the various political elem ents of the 
missile defense initiative while ignoring th e underlying technical feasibility.  The 
development of “high tech, low density” sy stems are expensive, risky, and require a 
sustained commitment.  Given this set of circ umstances, Japan has invested heavily in an 
initiative that m ay or m ay not achieve al l its purported objectives .  As a result, the 
technical f easibility of  missile defense systems and the typ e of  architecture required to  
adequately meet the conceiva ble missiles threats confrontin g Japan remain a subject of 
considerable debate.128 
 There is also a secondary consequence asso ciated with technical risk, specifically 
the costs as sociated with mitigation.  As m issile defense is absorbing a d isproportionate 
amount of t he Japanese defense budget, othe r initiatives suffer.  Collectively, th e hig h 
cost of m issile defense and the cap of 1% defense spending significantly constrain 
Japan’s investment options.129 This has a significant im pact on Japans arm y and navy as  
the cabinet significantly cut account levels in order to afford missile defense.130 
The changes have begun to m anifest themselves in several ways.  The Maritim e 
Self Defense Forces has had to reprioritize operations and cut its num bers of escort ships 
and fixed wing aircraf t.  The Air Se lf Defense Force’s acquisition of the PAC-3 m issile 
defense system has come at the exp ense of reducing its nu mbers of  tactical in terceptor 
aircraft.  The Ground Self Defens e Forces (GSDF) procurements  will have also been cut 
at a tim e where it is facing increas ed pressure to restructure to deal with low inten sity 
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threats such as insurgency and terrorism .131  This collec tively reinforces the single poin t 
that Japan has invested heavily in something that may not work well at the direct expense 
of other security priorities. 
While this im pediment has been heav ily voiced by those opposed to m issile 
defense, there are a few key elements that stand to refute it.  The first is that the technical 
hurdles have steadily been overcome, culminating in a well publicized test event in which 
Japanese naval assets w ere able to successfu lly shoot down a m issile in flight.  Further, 
although Japan’s procurem ent of m issile defe nse is com ing at the expense of other 
programs, the sunk cost already invested is of such m agnitude that cancelling the 
program would require a significan t reversal of course.  Give n the promising test results 
to date, as well as the potential for future prof it given the partial repeal of the export ban, 
there are sufficient reasons to suggest that this perceived barrier is steadily becoming less 
relevant.   
B. CONCLUSIONS 
 The progres s that Japan  has m ade in regards to  its secur ity initia tives is not a 
guarantor of further advancements.  There are several attendant risks surrounding missile-
defense, any one of whi ch could prompt a re-v isitation of the program .  Further, there is 
significant amount of public suppo rt for th e peace cons titution th at present a dom estic 
political concern for elected officials.   While Prime Minister Koizumi was able to a rush  
through security advances with relative ease,  his short-lived  successor Shinzo Abe did  
not occupy office long enough to continue this agenda.  The m ost recent administration, 
under Prim e Minister Fukuda, ha s tended to favor a m ore c onservative approach in 
security matters, opting to maintain the status quo rather than proceed with modifications 
to the  Cons titution.  C onsidered c ollectively, however, th ere a re equ ally com pelling 
circumstances under which the trend line could advance.  What can be treated for fact, 
however, is that the initiatives undertaken in conjunction with m issile defense rem ain 
unchanged, are grounded in legal revisions, and show no signs of receding. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. CONSIDERING THE TREND 
1. Assessing the Trend 
The preceding chapters have identified key events in the evolution of Japan’s Self 
Defense Forces (JSDF) with the  intent of  illustrating that a trend towar ds normalization 
exists and that the m issile def ense initiative h as contr ibuted signif icantly toward s its  
advancement.  W hile these events have been identified, they have not  been placed  in a 
context that clear ly illustrates the relative d egree to which missile def ense has im pacted 
Japanese defense.  In order to better assess these impacts, the following methodology has 
been developed using the event characterizations of force expansion, organizational shift, 
capability increases, statutory m ilestones, and forward deploym ents.  Each of these 
events is assigned an associated weighting value reflecting the degree to which they have 
lent them selves to the advancem ent of th e norm alization trend.  Specific m ilestones 
falling in to these agg regations are subse quently evaluated in term s of individual 
significance and then plotted in tim e.  The e nd result is a norm alization trend line that 
graphically portrays a steady advancement in Japan’s defense posture.  
To be sure, this reflects one of many possible ways to c onsider Japanese security.  
The intent in e mploying this assessment mechanism is not to provide an incontrovertible 
framework from which all secur ity evolutions can be con sidered, but rather to capture a 
distinct subset of events relevant to Ja pan and introduce additional context from  which 
more informed conclusions can be  reached.  Certa inly additional aggregations co uld be 
employed to capture a b roader range of event types, greater f idelity could be applied  to 
the weighting and ranking structure, and events  that have stalled or retarded th e trend  
could also be considered.  However, f or the purpose of illustrating a normalization trend 
and that m issile defense has advanced it, a to p level characterization is sufficient.  Th e 
following tables provide a m ore detailed breakout of the event aggregations and events 
identified for inclusion in the trend line. 
 90
Type Event Rationale for Event Inclusion Weighting Factor ( 0 - 1 ) Rationale for Weighting
Force Expansion/Reduction
A commonly used metric for comparing 
the military forces of respective states is 
their size.  While this does not account for 
any technological asymmetry that may 
exist, it does reflect the degree of 
manpower commitment that a given state 
has made to its defense establishment.  
0.5
Shifts in manpower commitments 
equate directly to enlarging or 
reducing a force.  Force ratios 
can, however, be overcome 
through technological advantage.  
For this reason, it is weighted at 
the median.
Significant Capability Increases
Similar to force expansion, the 
introduction of new capabilities generates 
options that would not otherwise be 
available.  Further, a states decision to 
invest significant amounts of capital in a 
given direction can be considered as an 
indicator of its defense priorities.
0.7
Technology often enables a 
relatively smaller force to achieve 
greater effects with less 
manpower.  Given the premium 
that Japan has placed on 
incorporating advanced 
technology in its forces, it is 
weighted higher than the median.
Organizational Shift
Shifts in organizational structure tend to 
reflect a shift in organizational focus.  As 
this can be interpreted as a necessary 
precursor to redefining the perceived 
function of the organization, they warrant 
consideration. 
0.6
The manner in which a force is 
organized is a significant factor in 
harnessing the potential of its 
manpower and capabilities.  Given 
the synergy that organizational 
structure can enable, it is 
weighted slightly higher than the 
median.
Statutory Milestone
Establishing shifts in defense policy as a 
matter of law reflects a degree of 
formality, state legitimacy, and 
permanence.  Legislation regarding 
military matters tend to reflect how a state 
views military roles and functions, thus 
warranting consideration.
0.8
Defense law reflects a significantly 
higher degree of state 
commitment to a course of action 
than a ministry policy or generally 
accepted practice.  With such 
commitment, it becomes possible 
to impact force size, capability and 
deployment.  Given the broader 
impacts of legislation, it is 
weighted substantially higher than 
the median.
Forward Deployment
The deployment of forces indicates a 
states willingness to employ its military 
and either project power abroad or 
intervene in regional crises.  This aspect 
of willingness speaks to the overall 
credibility of the force and bears 
consideration.
0.4
In the case of Japan, individual 
force deployments tend to be 
smaller in scope, occasionally a 
response to external pressure, and 
under the auspices of the UN.  
This is considerably different than 
large scale unilateral military 
action and is weighted lower than 
the median.
Security Event Aggregations and Weighting
 
Figure 11.   Security Event Aggregations and Weighting 
 
Figure (8) establishes the baseline for ge neral evaluation.  Figures (9) through 
(11) will identify signif icant events  occurring under these aggregations. 132  Each event 
will be ass igned a numeric va lue based on its rela tive s ignificance.  Again, ther e is an 
admittedly subjective quality to the scoring mechanism as a m atter of necessity.  As a 
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crude case in point, a decision to incr ease force structure by 10,000 or by 100,000 both 
reflect force expansion, but quite clearly of a different scale.  W hile numeric examples 
are fairly intuitive, less clear exam ples are found in legislatio n.  To clarify, a law passed 
with the ex press pu rpose of permitting a single deploym ent, while relevant in trend 
mapping, has a less far reach ing and endurin g im pact than a decision to perm it the  
military uses of space.  W hile both statu tory milestones, they require ad ditional context 
which for the purposes of this thesis w ill be found by assigning a quantitative value to 
each event.   
To be sure,  both the  identif ication of  key events and th e respe ctive values  
assigned could easily be contested on an indivi dual basis.  The intent, however, is not to 
create an in controvertible va lue ranking of the evolution of  the JSDF, but rather to 
identify suf ficient data points to allow f or a mo re empirical interpretation of the trend.  
While each event and v alue could be debated, what quickly becomes apparent is th at the 
overall trend of the JSDF is one of advancement. 
 
 
Year Event Event Type Weighting Factor
Magnitude of 
Event (1 - 5)
Event 
Score
1950 Establishment of National Police Reserve authorized Force Expansion 0.5 5 2.5
1950 National Police Reserve Ordinance promulgated Statutory Milestone 0.8 3 2.4
1952 Maritime Guard established within Japanese Coast Guard Force Expansion 0.5 3 1.5
1954 Defense Agency Establishment Law promulgated Statutory Milestone 0.8 5 4
1954 Self Defense Forces Law Promulgated Statutory Milestone 0.8 5 4
1954 Defense Agency established Organizational Shift 0.6 5 3
1956 First domestically produced F-86 
fighter delivered
Capability Increase 0.7 4 2.8
1957 First Defense Build-up Plan adopted Statutory Milestone 0.8 4 3.2
1958 ASDF begins measures to protect 
territorial airspace
Capability Increase 0.7 4 2.8
26.2
Security Event Ranking: 1950 - 1960
Aggregate Score: 1950 - 1960  
Figure 12.   Security Event Ranking: 1950 – 1960 (From: 132) 
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Year Event Event Type Weighting Factor
Magnitude of 
Event (1 - 5)
Event 
Score
1961 Second Defense Build-up Plan 
adopted
Statutory Milestone 0.8 4 3.2
1962 Defense Facilities Administration Agency established Organizational Shift 0.6 3 1.8
1965 Icebreaker Fuji dispatched to assist Antarctic observation Forward Deployment 0.4 3 1.2
1966 Third Defense Build-up Plan adopted Statutory Milestone 0.8 4 3.2
1969 Domestic production of F-4E approved Capability Increase 0.7 4 2.8
12.2
1972 Fourth Defense Build-up Plan 
adopted
Statutory Milestone 0.8 4 3.2
1973 ASDF air defense mission on Okinawa commences Capability Increase 0.7 3 2.1
1977 Introduction of F-15 and P-3s 
approved
Capability Increase 0.7 4 2.8
1978 First ASDF/USAF joint training exercises Capability Increase 0.7 5 3.5
1979 Introduction of E-2C approved Capability Increase 0.7 4 2.8
14.4
1980 MSDF/USN joint exercises Capability Increase 0.7 3 2.1
1981 GSDF/US joint communications exercise Capability Increase 0.7 3 2.1
1982 US/Japan combined command post exercise Capability Increase 0.7 3 2.1
1983 Transfer of military technology to US initiated Statutory Milestone 0.8 4 3.2
1986 Security Council Establishment Law enacted Statutory Milestone 0.8 4 3.2
1988 Initial development of FS-X in conjunction with US Capability Increase 0.7 3 2.1
14.8
1991 Deployment of MSDF vessels to the Persian Gulf Forward Deployment 0.4 5 2
1991
JSDF personnel assist in 
inspections of Iraqi chemical 
weapons
Forward Deployment 0.4 4 1.6
1992
JSDF units deployed to 
Cambodia in support of UN  
operations
Forward Deployment 0.4 3 1.2
1994 JSDF personnel deployed to Zaire to assist Rwandan refugees Forward Deployment 0.4 3 1.2
1996 JSDF support to UN observer force Forward Deployment 0.4 3 1.2
1997 Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters Capability Increase 0.7 4 2.8
1998 Establishment of JSDF ready reserve Force Expansion 0.5 3 1.5
1998 JSDF deployed to Honduras to support disaster relief Forward Deployment 0.4 3 1.2
1998 First JSDF joint exercise Capability Increase 0.7 5 3.5
1998 Japan - US cooperative research on missile defense approved Capability Increase 0.7 4 2.8
1999 JSDF personnel deployed to 
Turkey for disaster relief
Forward Deployment 0.4 2 0.8
1999 JSDF personnel deployed to Indonesia for refugee support Forward Deployment 0.4 2 0.8
20.6Aggregate Score: 1990 - 2000
Aggregate Score: 1970 - 1980
Security Event Ranking: 1960 - 2000
Aggregate Score: 1960 - 1970
Aggregate Score: 1980 - 1990
 
Figure 13.   Security Event Ranking: 1960 – 2000 (From: 132) 
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Year Event Event Type Weighting Factor
Magnitude of 
Event (1 - 5)
Event 
Score
2001 JSDF personnel deployed to India 
for disaster relief
Forward Deployment 0.4 2 0.8
2001 JSDF personnel deployed to UNMOVIC Forward Deployment 0.4 2 0.8
2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures 
Law promulgated
Statutory Milestone 0.8 5 4
2001 Self-Defense Forces Law promulgated Statutory Milestone 0.8 5 4
2001
MSDF vessels begin "cooperation 
and support" activities with US in 
the Indian Ocean
Forward Deployment 0.4 5 2
2001
MSDF vessels begin information 
gathering operations in the Indian 
Ocean
Forward Deployment 0.4 5 2
2002
MSDF vessels begin "cooperation 
and support" activities with UK in 
the Indian Ocean
Forward Deployment 0.4 5 2
2002 JSDF personnel deployed to East Timor Forward Deployment 0.4 2 0.8
2003 JSDF research group deployed to Iraq Forward Deployment 0.4 2 0.8
2003 Government introduces ballistic missile defense system Statutory Milestone 0.8 5 4
2003 JSDF personnel deployed to Kuwait Forward Deployment 0.4 4 1.6
2004 JSDF advance team deployed to Iraq Forward Deployment 0.4 4 1.6
2004 JSDF deployed to Thailand to assist in disaster relief Forward Deployment 0.4 2 0.8
2005 JSDF deployed to Indonesia to assist in disaster relief Forward Deployment 0.4 2 0.8
2005 JSDF deployed to Pakistan to assist in disaster relief Forward Deployment 0.4 2 0.8
2005
Security Council approves joint 
US development of interceptor 
missiles
Statutory Milestone 0.8 4 3.2
2006 JSDF deployed to Golan Heights Forward Deployment 0.4 2 0.8
2006
Defense Agency Establishment 
law is modified to allow for 
destruction of ballistic missiles
Statutory Milestone 0.8 5 4
2006 JSDF deployed to Indonesia to assist in disaster relief Forward Deployment 0.4 2 0.8
2007 Defense Agency transitioned to Ministry of Defense Organizational Shift 0.6 5 3
38.6Aggregate Score: 2000 - present
Security Event Ranking: 2000 - present
 





2. Plotting the Trend 
The preced ing section s have introdu ced a m ethodology for assessing k ey 
milestones in the evolution of Japanese secu rity and have identif ied signif icant ev ents 
over the past sixty years.  When placed in the context of relative time and magnitude, the 
trend becom es more readily apparent.  Th e following figures illustrate how  the  
normalization trend line has advanced over tim e based on the data points introduced in 
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Figure 16.   Security Advancements by Decade 
 
What becomes readily apparent after even a cursory examination of the tables is  
that following the initial spike attributable  to the introduction of  the JSDF precursor 
organizations and legislation in the 1950s, there was a significant lull in activity followed 
by a steady increase through the 1980s a nd a m arked increase from the 1990s and 
beyond.  Notably, the data is a rranged relative to tim e in order to fram e the degree of  
advancement in a given context.  In practice, ho wever, the events tend to be cum ulative.  
Expressed differently, the security gains achie ved in the 1960s could justifiably be added 
to those of the 1950s.  Even though progress v aries between decades, it is consistently 
advancing. 
3. Forecasting the Trend 
The preceding section h as provided a graphi c depiction of th e Japanese security 
trend to date, begging the ques tion of what  will o ccur n ext.  The future cannot be 
predicted with high reliability, but based on wh at has occurred to date and what would 
ostensibly be required to further advance th e trend som e reasonable assum ptions can be 
made.  The following are facet s of what a continuation of the norm alization trend  line 
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may entail and the con ditions that m ay preced e their ad option.  Note th at in som e 
instances, these advancements may be exclus ive of missile defense and represent other 
facets of the normalization trend. 
 
a) “Routine” force deployments: while Japan m aintains a considerable deployed 
footprint in support of UN operatio ns, each evolution is considered separately 
and requires its own legisl ation.  Given the regulari ty with which Japan has 
committed forces to UN  operations since th e early 1990s, it is reasonab le to 
expect some type of blanket legislation allowing for forces to be deployed as a 
matter of course rather than by excepti on.  Legislation such as this has been 
discussed previously and has a reasonabl y high probability of being adopted 
within the next decade sim ply because  it elim inates d ebate over what has  
become a generally foregone conclusion.   
Note that th is is n ot linked to m issile defense per se.  The  motivator f or 
such an action is most probably found in Japan’s desire to shed its “free-rider” 
image and streng then its position in r egards to the  UN Security  Co uncil.  
Notably, the latter would bolster Japan’ s position in regards to cham pioning 
missile defense efforts thus adding ju stification to its recent actions and 
potentially setting conditions for the future sale of missile defense technology. 
 
b) Increased arm s exports : by positioning itself as a st rong U.S. partner in the 
development of m issile defense system s, Japan is positioned to becom e a  
world leader in this niche security industry.  Given the ostensibly defensive 
nature of the system , the partial repeals on weapons export currently enacted, 
and the financial incentives to spread load the costs of the defense industry by 
gaining larger econom ies of scale it is not unreasonable to expect that Japan 




conditions under which this is likely  to occur are characterized by continued  
successful testing of Japanese m issile defense and increased proliferation of 
missiles. 
One of the fundamental motivations for Japan’s partial repeal of the export 
ban was to spread load developm ent co sts of m issile defense.  Clearly, the 
more costs  are sp read, the m ore cost effective the sys tem.  Having already 
taken the s tance that m issile defense is “pure ly” defensive in nature, th ere is 
an embedded justification for the sale of missile defense technology to other 
parties.  Given the combined factors of missile proliferation, improved missile 
defense technology, and Japan’s relative  positioning as an industry leader, 
within the d ecade more substantial expor ts of Japanese weapons techno logy 
can be expected. 
 
c) Proportionately increased defense spending: in recent times, Japan has made a 
concerted effort to lim it defense spending to 1% of the GNP.  W hile this has 
generally been met, it is not inviolate.   As m odern defense systems generally 
involve high technology and a commensurately high  risk, costs can easily 
mount.  Considered in this  context, the prim ary factor driving the need for a 
larger defense budget is the cost of missile defense.  For Japan to remain at the 
forefront of increasingly prolific de fense technology, it can be expected to 
both partner in defense developm ent as  well as comm it additional funds as 
required.  In practice, this  has very likely occurred  but under the auspices of  
separate budget authority.  So, while defense spending may be restricted to the 
1% cap, the Ministry of  Defense may reap  the benefits of funds allocated to 
the Space Agency or Coast Guard.  This  is not an uncommon practice for any 
government, and the lines blur even fu rther given the fungible nature of 
technologic breakthroughs.   
In all likelihood, efforts will continue to keep  defense spending beneath 
the limit but there are conditions under which this could change.  By investing 
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heavily in m issile defense, Japan ha s less working capital to support the 
operations and m aintenance of the JSDF.  However, it is necessary for Japan 
to sustain th e exis ting f orce to  sup port current UN comm itments and better  
position itself for a seat on the UN S ecurity Council.  G iven the relative 
prestige and  com parative power of this positio n, it is not unreasonab le to 
expect Japan to increase proportional defense spending as required to remain a 
viable candidate.  Given the ever growi ng crisis locations, this change could 
also be expected within a decade.   
 
d) Shifts to offensive doctrine: the challenge of a defensive force is th at it has to  
absorb the f irst blow.  This is particul arly prob lematic when the leth ality of  
the first strike is sufficiently overwhe lming s o as to preclude retaliation.  
While existing Japanese security policy speaks to both prevention and 
preemption, what is necessary to make such policy effectiv e is a capacity to 
deliver the first blow.  While the hardware within the Japanese arsenal has the 
potential, the accompanying doctrine tends to be defensive in tone.   In an era 
where offe nsive and defensive charact erization of a weapons system is  
increasingly less meaningful, the advantage is gained in how it is used.  Given 
the lim ited utility of  a def ensive c haracterization and a steady increase in 
multi-national exercises with the U.S. in support of m issile defense, it is not 
unreasonable to expect a Japanese sh ift to  a m ore of fensive doctrin e, 
beginning with the ASDF and steadily permeating the broader force. 
Missile defense is again a factor in th is scenario.  The ideal of preem ption 
was introduced as part of the funda mental premise that missiles are easiest to 
destroy before they leav e the groun d.  To acco mplish that, tactics need  to be 
modified to  allow f or the su rreptitious entry of forces, typically aircraft, 
through threat defenses and fire before  being fired upon.  This is a marked 
departure from the tactics associated with a defensive com bat air patrol, and a 
favorable option for effective missile defense. 
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e) Constitutional m odification: this is ostens ibly th e pinnacle of Japanese 
security normalization.  By modifying the constitution to accept that the use of 
force is som etimes ne cessary would be a clear dom estic and international 
signal that Japan has taken a m ajor st ep towards norm alization.  Given the 
popular appeal of the “peace constitution,”  this is unlikely to occur without 
some type of exogenous shock and cannot  readily be placed on a tim eline. 
Were another Koizumi-like Pr ime Minis ter to em erge it is  possible th at th is 
threshold could be crossed.  The cond ition under which this becom es more 
probable, though, is a North Korean act of aggression, intentional or 
otherwise.  Should a North Korean m issile test fall short and strike Japan, 
public sentim ent would presum ably turn  m ore hawkish and m ore critical of  
the governm ent’s failure to protect it s citizenry.  This would reduce the 
political liability of advocating constitutional change, and potentially increase 
the like lihood of  enacting it.  Note  that  while this is no t envisioned as an 
outgrowth of m issile defense, per se, it is a po tential outcome of  the missile 
threat. 
 
f) Employment of m ilitary forces in support of national objectives : the 
employment of Japanese military force to secure a national objective would be 
a clear ind icator of  normalization regardless of  constitutional debate.  To be 
sure, this is not a proba ble event, b ut as an isla nd nation with lim ited natural 
resources, to include high energy dependencies, there are conceivably 
conditions in which  J apan would  be tem pted to em ploy its  m ilitary.  
Conceptually, these conditions include territorial disputes, preemption against 
North Korea, freedom  of navigatio n, a nd access to oil rese rves in Central 
Asia.  The main point, however, is  that should Japan use its m ilitary in such a 





reside outside the m issile defense rubric , as it envisions the use of for ce to 
seize an objective of som e type rather than preclude or prevent dam age to 
Japan itself.  
The preceding paragraphs have identified events that would advance the security 
normalization trend line establ ished throughout this thesis.  While some events are more 
probable than others, they share a co mmon thread in tha t any one of  them constitutes a 
change from the status quo.  Japan has com e to realize that m odern security cannot be  
achieved through the methods of the previous generation, and has steadily adapted to this  
reality.  However, these changes do not occur in isolation.  As Japan modifies its security 
posture, there are also ramifications for the U.S. 
B. U.S. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Japan’s current security situation is evolving.  Over the past few years adaptations 
have occurred that would have been unthinka ble in the early 1950s.  As Japan m aps out 
its future security apparatus, the U. S. is a lso af fected.  The  resu ltant question becomes 
one of how the U.S. should engage Japan relati ve to its own interests.  The following are 
policy recommendations that consider Japanese security in the context of U.S. concerns. 
1. Sustained Pursuit of Japanese Constitutional Revision 
The U.S. is investing a considerable am ount of tim e and effort assisting Japan 
develop a m issile defense capability.  Furthe r, while not as pronounced as the very 
proximal threat th at North Korea presents  to Japan, the U.S. also has m issile 
vulnerabilities.  Given the ranges and traject ories that m ay be involved with a potential 
missile attack against the U.S., there exists a very real possibility that Japan may be best 
positioned to destroy th e m issile.  Under the c urrent inte rpretation of  the Constitution 
Japan would not legally be bound to do so.  Th is presents itself as  a largely one-sided 
arrangement which does not best represent U.S. interests. 
The impediment at this point is Japan’s interpretation of the Constitution.  As this 
interpretation is th e im pediment to enhance missile se curity f or the U.S., it stan ds to  
reason that the U.S. should take som e action to  facilitate Japanese changes to either the 
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interpretation or to the Constitu tion its elf.  T his is perh aps bes t achieved thro ugh 
sustained and gentle coercion, as a m ore di rect approach m ay prom pt m uch stauncher  
nationalism and defeat the overall purpose. W hile th is appe ars to  be a very in trusive 
means of achieving U.S. interests, it is a fa r more palatable option than not addressing an 
issue at the heart of a security matter.     
Japan ultimately has to consider two politi cal scenarios.  The first is on e in which 
domestic po litical concerns preclude constitu tional change.  Advocates for said chan ge 
place at ris k their political careers  and ar e otherwise uns uccessful in  ushering  in a 
modified constitution.  The second is the in ternational political consequence of willfully 
allowing a m issile to strike th e U.S. despite  having had the  capability to stop it.  W hile 
both of  these are unattr active propositions, the latte r impacts far more than caree rs.  A 
scenario such as this, if widely known, could reasonably be expected to prompt a scathing 
rebuke from the broader U.S. population.  In th is context, a new set of  U.S. dom estic 
pressures em erge that can reasonably be ex pected to have a se vere and imm ediate 
adverse impact on Japanese relations. 
2. Inextricable System Linkages and Redundancy 
The preceding section addressed an  element of legality, but there are alternative 
means to address the challenge.  Accepting that  the current interpretation of the Japanese 
Constitution would prec lude ass isting the U.S.  in the even t of  a m issile attack  another 
way of solving the problem  would be through  engineering the m issile defense system  
such that the sensors are so inextricably linked all parties share a common picture.  With 
sufficient advance warning and characterizati on of the trajectory the legally acceptable 
firing unit could be notified without prompting undue legal drama. 
While the sharing of sensor inform ation could itself be interpreted as an 
encroachment upon the Japanese constitu tion, it is m ore practically a system ic feature 
and limitation.  This could be construed as a feature in that for Japan’s own security to be 
achieved it derives very direct benefit from U.S. sensors.  The operating picture cannot be 
complete unless reciprocating data from Japan’s own sensors are provided and correlated.  
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For the practical m atter of tr acking and shootin g, this  is  a positive attribute.  Fro m the 
matter of constitutional interpretation, it is a limitation. 
What this suggests is that an alternative way for the U.S. to derive benefit from 
Japanese elements of m issile defense is to engin eer it in  such a m anner that the ben efits 
are transparent.  W hile this has a tinge of s ubterfuge about it, it is practical and arguably 
far less intrusive than advocating for Japan to change its constitution 
3. Press for Overt Normalization 
The preced ing sections have consid ered poss ible options  for the U.S. to extract 
greater benefit from Japan’s missile defense assets.  Notably, the proposed U.S. advocacy 
of constitutional m odification was restric ted to  the very n arrow conf ines of  m issile 
defense.  While this would offer benefit to  th e U.S., it f ails to add ress a m ore overt 
Japanese declaration of nor malization.  On e of the fundam ental issues surrounding 
Japan’s current security ideology is that it  is m asked despite its  transparency.  As 
contradictory as this may sound, it captures the irony of a state that is constitutionally 
prohibited f rom having a m ilitary maintaining one of  the world’s m ost techno logically 
advanced military forces.  The issue is the consequence that is associated with this irony. 
To frame this a little bit more broadly, c onsider one possible interpretation of the 
existence of  the JSDF.  A state tha t is cons titutionally pro hibited f rom m aintaining a 
military develops a national police reserve originally trained by the U.S. Army.  Over the 
years it com es to be equippe d with tanks and arm ored pers onnel carriers and artillery.  
The maritime and air forces are am ong the b est equipped an d trained in the world.   The 
defense budget is consistently among the top five in the world.  While Japan is very open 
about what is procuring it has closed its ey es to the perception that accom panies the 
existence of such a formidable military capability. 
By continually asse rting the def ensive na ture of the JSDF, Japan sim ply draws 
attention to  its of fensive potential.  This  m ask of defense in troduces a degree of 
ambiguity that is other wise incons istent and appears to b e a ladder of escalation.   By 
asserting that it has beco me a nor malized state that fully ass erts the right of war far les s 
ambiguous signals can be sent and a far clearer  interpretation of Japan’s planned use of 
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force under certain circum stance can be provi ded.  The existing circum stance in which 
Japan’s military behaves much like a normal military while asserting that it is not present 
itself as a type of hypocrisy and proves as an impediment in signaling between states. 
No state views itself  a s a blatan t aggresso r.  In this rega rd, all m ilitaries a re 
defensive in  nature and  so m uch as they def end the inter ests of  the state.  Tha t these  
interests are defended through the seizure of territory or the destruction of an adversary 
does not refute the fundam ental rationale for such actions.  For Japan to acknowledge  
such a standpoint, the U.S. could conceivabl y reduce or further spread load security 
responsibilities in the Pacific theater.  Sustained diplom atic pressure over tim e offers the 
best chance of success in prompting Japan to further increase its security role.    
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The preceding pages have dem onstrated that the JSDF has s teadily evolved and 
that missile defense has played a significant role in that evolution.  While the body of 
evidence presented supports this case, there are areas in which addition al research would 
prove beneficial.  The following are specific topics for future research which would 
expand this thesis and invariably highlight other topics of interest. 
1. Trend Mapping 
For the purposes of this thesis, elem ents of the evolution of Japan’s defense 
apparatus were highligh ted.  Adm ittedly, this history is f ar riche r th an the subset of 
events explored in  th is docum ent.  A m ore extensive  rev iew and a ssessment of  this 
history would be of some value in assessing the relative magnitude of subsequent security 
events.  W hile the basic m ethodology presented is reasonably sound, it could easily be  
expanded upon.   
2. Trend Projection 
While the preceding paragraph speaks to characterizing what has occurred, it is  
also possible and beneficial to m ake a m ore concerted  effort towards identifying what 
will occur n ext.  This thesis has id entified a se t of  events that could b e interp reted as 
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advancing the security trend without conducti ng a detailed study of th eir probability.  By 
examining these events m ore closely, it m ay be possible to better assess their relative 
likelihood.  Depending on the event being ex amined, this could conceivably entail a 
closer look at dom estic politics an d prevaili ng political sentim ent within Japan, o r the 
degree of political rhetoric and actions being taken by North Korea.  In all cases, 
however, each event could be scrutinized and assessed more closely. 
3. Economic Motivations of the Japanese Defense Industry 
For the most part, this thesis has assumed that security advancement has been the 
driving impetus behind missile defense.  However, the Japanese defense industry also has 
the potential to ben efit f rom this initiative .  Largely lim ited to a dom estic m arket, the 
Japanese defense industry has often assum ed significant risk and has not benefitted from 
the econom ies of scale found in other states.  Viewed from this vantage point, a new 
stakeholder emerges.  Given th e ingrained nature of Japane se business and its political 
system, it is not unreasonable to assum e that  the defense industry played som e part in 
advancing the m issile defense initiative.  It  w ould be of som e benefi t to identify the 
degree to which economic motivations influence the Japanese security dialogue. 
4. Technical Feasibility of Missile Defense 
Detractors o f missile de fense initiatives f requently asse rted that it is  simply not 
technically viable.  However,  over the past few years se veral promising tests have 
indicated that in time it may achieve the potential originally envisioned for it.  In addition 
to assessing  the technical feasib ility of Ja panese m issile defense, it would also be 
worthwhile to assess the potential regional impacts should Japan develop a robust means 
to defend itself from the potential missile threat found in both North Korea and China. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Following World W ar II, Japan has had to steadily redefine its position in the 
international system.  One aspec t of  this is the  evolution  of  the JSDF.  From  its initia l 
inception as  an elem ent of the National Poli ce Reserve to its cu rrent in carnation as  a 
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world class m ilitary, th e JSDF has f ollowed a consistent tre nd which in dicates a p ath 
towards security normalization.  While this trend finds its or igins in the early 1950s, the  
Japanese pursuit of missile defense has pl ayed a s ignificant role in its  continued 
advancement.   
Under the broad rubric of m issile defe nse, Japan has had to re-evaluate its 
position on  the m ilitary use of space, the export of weapons techno logy, collectiv e 
security, command aut hority, and the condi tions under which pre-emption m ay be 
warranted.  These changes have m anifested them selves in m any ways, to include 
statutory changes, restruct uring an d elevation  of the form er Defense Agency, an 
increased emphasis on joint serv ice interoperability, and the acquisiti on of a broad range 
of advanced technologies.  It  is undeniable that the trend towards security normalization 
began with the incep tion of  the police reserve,  but it can also be as serted that m issile 
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